Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime by Hasnas, John
American University Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 3 Article 3
2005
Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime
John Hasnas
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hasnas, John. "Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime." American University Law Review 54, no.3 (2005): 579-660.
Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol54/iss3/3
HASNAS 10/3/2005 1:33 PM 
 
579 
ETHICS AND THE PROBLEM OF WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME 
JOHN HASNAS* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ...............................................................................................580 
 I. The Logical Requirements of the Federal Effort to Suppress 
White Collar Crime.........................................................................585 
 A. The Nature of White Collar Crime ..........................................585 
 B. The Evolution of White Collar Criminal Law.........................588 
 1. Problems of enforcement ...................................................588 
 2. The solutions......................................................................595 
 a. Corporate criminal responsibility.................................595 
 b. New offenses................................................................602 
 c. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines..................619 
 II. Five Ethical Dilemmas....................................................................631 
 A. Organizational Justice..............................................................633 
 B. Privacy.....................................................................................637 
 C. Confidentiality .........................................................................640 
 D. Trust.........................................................................................646 
 E. Ethical Self-Assessment ..........................................................651 
Conclusion .................................................................................................655 
 
                                                          
 *  Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University, J.D. & Ph.D. in Philosophy, 
Duke University, LL.M. in Legal Education, Temple University.  The author wishes to thank 
Ellen Podgor and Paul Rosenzweig for inviting him to participate in the symposium, 
Gregory Clinton of George Mason University School of Law for his invaluable research 
help, Ann C. Tunstall of SciLucent, LLC for her exceeding helpful comments on a draft of 
this article, Annette P. Tunstall for her literary advice, and Annette Hasnas of the 
Montessori School of Northern Virginia for providing the author with first-hand experience 
with the problem of overcriminalization.  The author also wishes to extend sincere thanks to 
the editors and members of the American University Law Review, whom he has good 
reason to know to be astute and conscientious legal scholars. 
 
HASNAS 10/3/2005  1:33 PM 
580 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:579 
INTRODUCTION 
Before reading this article, please take the following multiple choice 
quiz: 
(1) You are the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Marsha Tudor Styles, 
Inc. (MTS), one of the country’s largest retailers of products for 
homemakers.  Your company is highly profitable and closely identified 
with its founder and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Marsha Tudor, 
who publishes a magazine and hosts a television show concerning 
homemaking.  Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
investigated Tudor for suspected insider trading for selling one million 
dollars of stock in a company owned by a personal friend, just before a 
sharp decline in the price of its stock.  In the course of her voluntary 
cooperation with the investigation, Tudor stated that she sold the stock 
pursuant to a pre-established stop-loss order.  When news of the 
investigation became public, Tudor asserted her innocence of insider 
trading on a national news program.  Although Tudor has not been charged 
with insider trading, she has been indicted for obstruction of justice for 
telling federal investigators that she sold her stock pursuant to a stop-loss 
order, and for securities fraud for attempting to prop up the value of MTS 
stock by falsely proclaiming her innocence to the public.  You have known 
Ms. Tudor for many years and tend to believe that she is innocent of the 
charges, although you cannot be entirely sure. In this situation, which of the 
following constitutes the ethically appropriate action for you to take in your 
capacity as CEO? 
(a) Publicly support Ms. Tudor and offer whatever aid the corporation 
can give her in her effort to clear her name. 
(b) Take no action. This matter does not concern the corporation. 
(c) Consult with corporate counsel and immediately take steps designed 
to protect the corporation against any potential civil liability, and to 
preserve its defenses against any potential criminal charges. 
(d) Ask Ms. Tudor to resign as Chairman of the Board of Directors until 
her legal troubles are resolved and cooperate with the government’s 
criminal investigation of Ms. Tudor to the extent that doing so is consistent 
with preserving the company’s legal defenses and respecting all promises 
of confidentiality including those granted by corporate counsel under the 
attorney-client privilege. 
(e) Authorize the corporation to plead guilty to securities fraud and aid 
the government’s criminal investigation of Ms. Tudor in every way, 
including waiving the corporation’s attorney-client privilege and turning 
over records of all of Ms. Tudor’s appointments, phone calls, e-mails, and 
confidential consultations with the corporate counsel. 
(2) You are a senior executive at the Stone Fund, a large mutual fund 
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company.  The majority of investors in the Stone Fund are small investors, 
but the fund has several large investors as well as several institutional 
investors.  Until recently, Gordon Gekko was one of the fund’s most 
successful manager/brokers.  He was responsible for acquiring most of the 
large investors in the fund.  He apparently did this by allowing several of 
these investors to make trades after 4:00 p.m., which is illegal.  Budd Fox, 
a junior broker who worked for Gekko, processed many of the late trades.  
Fox, who had been hired right out of business school, was not at first aware 
that he was doing anything wrong.  Gekko’s high status in the company, his 
forceful personality, and his assurance that the late trades were perfectly 
acceptable and were standard operating procedure in the industry led Fox to 
carry out Gekko’s orders without qualm.  Eventually becoming suspicious, 
Fox approached Stone Fund’s corporate counsel in confidence to inquire 
about the legality of his actions.  Upon thus learning of the late trades, 
Stone Fund immediately fired Gekko and reported his actions to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC.  Which of the following constitutes 
the ethically appropriate action for you to take with respect to Fox? 
(a) Assign him to work with a broker who can serve as an ethical mentor, 
and employ the legal resources of the company to help him defend himself 
against any criminal charges that may be brought as a result of his 
association with Gekko. 
(b) Allow him to continue working for the company, but do not use 
corporate resources to aid him in defending any criminal charges that are 
brought against him personally. 
(c) Fire Fox. 
(d) Fire Fox and recommend that the company report his activities to the 
DOJ and the SEC. 
(e) Fire Fox and recommend that the company not only report his 
activities to the DOJ and the SEC, but offer to cooperate with the 
prosecutors in building a case against Fox by waiving the company’s 
attorney-client privilege and turning over to the government any evidence 
that could possibly aid in establishing his guilt. 
(3) You are the new CEO of Endrun, Inc., a very troubled corporation.  
Acting without the knowledge of Endrun’s former CEO, Kevin Lie, the 
company’s Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief Accounting Officer 
(CAO) had been using improper accounting practices to disguise the size of 
the company’s debt and inflate its profits.  When this fraud came to light, 
Endrun was forced to restate its earnings for the past several years, causing 
the company to suffer serious losses in the third and fourth quarters as well 
as a sharp decline in the price of its stock.  The COO and CAO have since 
pled guilty to securities and wire fraud, and Lie resigned as CEO.  You 
stepped in to try to staunch the bleeding and revive the company.  You 
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have just learned that Lie has been indicted for wire fraud for statements he 
made at an “All Employee Meeting” video teleconference.  At that 
meeting, Lie said: 
(i) “The third quarter is looking great.  We will hit our numbers.  We are 
continuing to have strong growth in our businesses, and I think we are 
positioned for a strong fourth quarter.” 
(ii) “I have strongly encouraged our officers to buy additional Endrun 
stock.  Some, including myself, have done so over the last couple of 
months and others will probably do so in the future.  My personal belief is 
that Endrun stock is an incredible bargain at current prices.”  
(iii) “Liquidity is fine.  As a matter of fact, it’s better than fine, it’s 
strong.” 
The indictment claims that these statements constitute a scheme and 
artifice to defraud Endrun and its shareholders of their intangible right to 
Lie’s honest services because: 
With regard to statement (i), Lie knew that Endrun was about to 
announce a quarterly loss for the third quarter and that lowering the 
previous earning statements was going to adversely affect the company. 
With regard to statement (ii), Lie deliberately created the impression 
with Endrun employees that his confidence in the company’s stock was 
such that he had increased his personal ownership of Endrun stock in the 
past two months, when, in fact, Lie knew that during the prior “couple of 
months,” he had purchased approximately $4 million in Endrun stock but 
sold $24 million in Endrun stock in response to margin calls, and that these 
sales were concealed from Endrun employees and the rest of the investing 
public. 
With regard to statement (iii), Lie knew that the only readily available 
source of liquidity was the $3 billion corporate line of credit, which, if 
drawn, would signal the dire straits of Endrun’s finances. 
Lie claims that none of his statements were false, that at the time he 
made them he genuinely believed Endrun could overcome its problems, 
that he was acting responsibly as CEO to maintain employee morale in a 
time of crisis, and that the charges against him are driven by political 
pressure to find a scapegoat for employee and investor losses on the stock 
market.  Which of the following constitutes the ethically appropriate action 
for you to take as CEO? 
(a) Publicly support Mr. Lie, offer whatever aid the corporation can give 
him in defending himself against the charges, and honor the company’s 
policy of reimbursing the legal expenses of corporate officers who incur 
such expenses as a result of their activities on behalf of the corporation. 
(b) Honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy, but take 
no other action with regard to Mr. Lie’s case. 
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(c) Honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy, and 
consult with corporate counsel to determine the extent to which Mr. Lie’s 
situation creates the risk of civil or criminal liability for the corporation and 
take appropriate steps to defend against such liability. 
(d) Honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy, but 
cooperate with the government’s criminal investigation of Mr. Lie to the 
extent that doing so is consistent with preserving the company’s legal 
defenses and respecting all promises of confidentiality, including those 
granted by corporate counsel under the attorney-client privilege. 
(e) Do not honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy for 
Mr. Lie, authorize the corporation to plead guilty to wire fraud, and aid the 
government’s criminal investigation of Mr. Lie in every way, including 
waiving the corporation’s attorney-client privilege, turning over all 
corporate documents that may bear on the case, and attempting to recover 
and turn over any corporate documents that Mr. Lie may have in his 
personal possession. 
Thank you for taking the quiz.  The purpose of this Article is to explore 
how federal efforts to combat “white collar” crime bear on the answers to 
these and similar questions. 
Specifically, I intend to examine how the federal standard for corporate 
criminal responsibility, the requirements of several of the federal statutes 
used to combat white collar crime, and the incentives created by United 
States Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations1 influence the decisions of 
business people confronted with difficult ethical dilemmas.  I will suggest 
that, in the context of federal criminal law, there are many ways in which 
compliance is not ethical and ethical behavior is not compliance.  As a 
result, the current federal campaign against white collar crime frequently 
undermines, rather than enhances, the efforts of business people to behave 
ethically. 
I do not mean for the title of this article to be misleading.  “Ethics and 
the Problem of White Collar Crime” may suggest an article arguing that the 
increasing frequency of white collar crime requires renewed efforts to 
ensure that business people behave more ethically and obey the law.  This 
is clearly not the thesis I pursue.  But the fact that the title can suggest such 
a thesis reflects two uncritically accepted assumptions that often lie at the 
heart of efforts to reduce business-related crime.  These assumptions are 
that the law commands only ethical behavior and that business people who 
behave ethically have nothing to fear from the law.  Although these 
assumptions may generally be true, they patently are not in an increasing 
                                                          
 1. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2004) [hereinafter 
U.S.S.G.], available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/CHAP8.pdf. 
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number of cases that can produce achingly poignant situations for business 
people who act in naive reliance upon them. 
The sole professional obligation of federal prosecutors is to punish and, 
to whatever extent possible, prevent violation of federal criminal law.  In 
most cases, business people, too, have an obligation to ensure that members 
of their firms do not violate federal law, but this is not their only, or even 
their primary, obligation.  To employ current business terminology, 
business people have obligations to their stakeholders.  They have a 
fiduciary duty to their principals, the stockholders, to use the stockholder’s 
resources only as authorized and to advance the purposes for which the 
firm was organized.  They have contractual, as well as informal customary 
obligations to their employees, customers, and suppliers.  Further, they 
have their ordinary ethical obligations as human beings to honor their 
commitments and to deal honestly with others.  These obligations can, and 
to an increasing extent do, conflict with the obligation to take the most 
effective steps to comply with federal law.  When the law provides 
incentives to violate one’s ethical duties to others, business people face a 
difficult choice.  Federal prosecutors do not.  Business people must decide 
the extent to which they can ethically expose their firm to the risk of legal 
liability in order to meet their other obligations.  Federal prosecutors, 
whose only obligation is to the law, need only judge the level of the firm’s 
legal compliance.  Simply expressed, business people’s ethical dilemmas 
are not federal prosecutors’ problem. 
In this Article, I intend to explore the ethical difficulties this divergence 
of interests poses for those engaged in business.  In Part II, I will introduce 
what is perhaps an idiosyncratic definition of white collar crime to 
distinguish the efforts of the federal government to combat business-related 
crime from traditional state-level criminal enforcement.  I will then identify 
the special difficulties that the traditional rules of criminal law pose for 
federal efforts to police business activity, and detail the substantive and 
procedural innovations that were introduced into federal criminal law to 
surmount these difficulties.  In Part III, I will identify five areas in which 
these legal innovations create difficult ethical dilemmas for the 
conscientious business person.  Specifically, I will argue that these 
innovations make it more difficult for businesses to realize organizational 
justice, properly respect employees’ privacy, maintain needed 
confidentiality, engender trust within the organization, and engage in 
ethical self-assessment.  In Part IV, I will conclude by providing an 
explanation for the divergence between ethics and compliance and 
suggesting that the solution to the problem of white collar crime may not 
lie in the use of harsher measures to crack down on white collar criminals, 
but in restraining the power of federal prosecutors to do so at all. 
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I. THE LOGICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL EFFORT TO SUPPRESS 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
A. The Nature of White Collar Crime 
White collar crime can be defined in many ways. It has been defined as 
crime committed by one of respectable or high social status2 or in the 
course of one’s occupation,3 as crime that involves deceit or a breach of 
trust,4 as nonviolent crime undertaken for personal gain,5 as crime that 
involves a combination of these factors,6 and simply as business crime.7  
None of these definitions specifies the class of offenses that I wish to 
address in this article, however.  I intend to restrict my focus to federal law, 
and then even more narrowly to the particular subset of federal law that is 
designed to police the behavior of those engaged in business for honest 
dealing and compliance with regulatory requirements.  Because all of the 
above definitions include state offenses, and many include non-business-
related crime as well, none of them correspond to the class of offense in 
which I am interested.  Accordingly, for purposes of this Article, I will 
employ the phrase ‘white collar crime’ in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner 
to refer exclusively to behavior that is the object of federal efforts to ensure 
honest dealing and regulatory compliance in business. 
Under this stipulative definition, white collar criminal law constitutes a 
discrete subset of American criminal law.  It is distinct from state criminal 
                                                          
 2. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME:   THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983) 
(explaining that “[w]hite collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed 
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”). 
 3. James W. Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 AM. J. 
SOC. 406, 407 (1987) (finding that white collar crime consists of illegal acts by individuals 
or groups who are otherwise conducting legal and respectable business). 
 4. Susan P. Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal:   Reconsidering the 
Concept of White Collar-Crime, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 346, 346 (1990) (arguing that “white 
collar criminals violate norms of trust, enabling them to rob without violence and burgle 
without trespass.”). 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT (1983) (“White Collar 
Crimes are illegal acts that use deceit and concealment—rather than the application or threat 
of physical force or violence—to obtain money, property, or service; to avoid the payment 
or loss of money; or to secure a business or personal advantage.”); BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 
215 (2d ed. 1981) (“[N]onviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed 
by anyone having special technical and professional knowledge of business and 
government, irrespective of the person’s occupation.”). 
 6. See Hamelkamp, J., Ball, R., and Townsend, K. (eds.), Definitional Dilemma:  Can 
and Should There Be a Universal Definition of White Collar Crime?  PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ACADEMIC WORKSHOP (Morgantown, WV: National White Collar Crime Center Training 
and Research Institute, 1996) 330 (describing white collar crime as “[i]llegal or unethical 
acts that violate fiduciary responsibility or public trust, committed by an individual or 
organization, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by persons of 
high or respectable social status for personal or organizational gain.”). 
 7. See HARRY FIRST, FIRST’S BUSINESS CRIME:   CASES AND MATERIALS v (1990). 
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law, which is directed against actions that either directly harm or violate the 
rights of others or constitute inherently immoral activity—the so-called 
morals offenses or victimless crimes.  This “traditional” conception of 
crime, which is the subject of the typical first-year law school course in 
criminal law, consists of offenses such as murder, rape, kidnapping, and 
theft as well as prostitution, use of illegal narcotics, and, somewhat 
famously, taking a girl under the age of sixteen out of the care of her 
parents without their consent.  White collar crime is also distinct from 
much of federal criminal law, which, in addition to prohibiting offenses of 
purely national concern such as treason or counterfeiting, also prohibits 
“traditional” criminal activity when that activity transcends state 
boundaries.  As used in this article, the term white collar crime refers 
exclusively to the class of federal offenses designed to police business 
behavior that do not fit within these categories. 
The distinction between ordinary and white collar criminal law is 
perhaps best illustrated by a comparison of what constitutes fraudulent 
behavior under each.  State law criminalizes fraudulent conduct when it 
amounts to larceny by false pretenses.8  To establish the offense of false 
pretenses, “the prosecutor was required to prove that defendant obtained 
title or possession of money or personal property of another by means of an 
intentional false statement concerning a material fact upon which the 
victim relied in parting with the property.”9  False pretenses criminalizes 
dishonest behavior only when it is intended to and effective in obtaining 
property on the basis of a representation of fact that is known to be false 
upon which the other party actually relies.10  This is a fairly strict set of 
requirements that punishes dishonesty only when it causes significant harm 
to others.  The epitome of white collar criminal law, on the other hand, is 
the federal mail fraud statute.11  To establish the offense of mail fraud, the 
                                                          
 8. E.g., M.G.L.A. 266 § 30 (2004) (Larceny; General Provisions and Penalties); MD. 
CODE ANN., [CRIM. LAW] § 7-109 (2004) (Crimes Including Theft); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
178 (2004) (False Pretences); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-24 (2004) (Crimes Against Property). 
 9. People v. Drake, 462 N.E.2d 376, 377 (N.Y. 1984). 
 10. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 957 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that “[f]alse 
pretenses, a statutory crime, although defined in slightly different ways in the various 
jurisdictions, consists in most jurisdictions of five elements:   (1) a false representation of a 
material present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to pass title to (4) his property to 
the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b) intends thereby to 
defraud the victim.”); HOWARD G. LEVENTHAL, 1 CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO 
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW YORK § 50:2 (2004) (noting that the “elements of proof 
required to establish larceny by false pretenses are:   (a) criminal intent to deprive the owner 
of property; (b) that defendant made a false representation of a past or existing fact; (c) that 
defendant knew the representation was false when made; (d) that defendant obtained 
property of another; and (e) that the representation was believed and relied on by the person 
to whom made and that person was in whole or in part induced thereby to give his property 
to the defendant.”). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004). 
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prosecution must establish only that the defendant intentionally participated 
in a scheme or artifice to defraud that involves use of the mail or private 
carrier service.12  This statute criminalizes dishonest behavior intended to 
deprive others of property or the intangible right to another’s honest 
services13 on the basis of a false representation or promise, regardless of 
whether anyone actually relies on the representation or promise or is 
deprived of property or honest services.14  These broad provisions 
authorize the punishment of almost any kind of dishonest or deceptive 
behavior, even when no other party has suffered any harm.  Thus, mail 
fraud charges have been brought against a developer for attempting to sell 
homes by falsely claiming that they were good investments15 and against a 
physician for referring patients to a hospital without disclosing to the 
patients that the hospital paid him a fee for the referrals.16 
The mail fraud statute is typical of white collar crime in that it empowers 
the federal government to police dishonest conduct that is otherwise 
beyond the scope of traditional criminal law.  Other offenses that share this 
feature and thus fall within the white collar crime category include general 
offenses such as wire, bank, and securities fraud, and Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violations, specific offenses that 
involve a violation of federal regulations, and subsidiary offenses such as 
money laundering, making false statements to federal investigators, and 
obstruction of justice.  For purposes of this article, this is the realm of white 
collar crime. 
B. The Evolution of White Collar Criminal Law 
1. Problems of enforcement 
Both the substantive and procedural rules of “traditional” Anglo-
American criminal law evolved over the course of centuries in the crucible 
of the conflict between Parliament and the Crown for power and the 
struggle to preserve the “rights of Englishmen” against the prerogatives of 
the King.  This is not the place to retell this tale other than to observe that 
by the beginning of the twentieth century, the process had produced a body 
                                                          
 12. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1168 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(“[T]he Government must prove that the defendants ‘(1) intentionally participated in a 
scheme or artifice to defraud and (2) used the United States mails to carry out that scheme 
or artifice.’”). 
 13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (defining the terms “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud” in the 
Code). 
 14. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) (holding that “[t]he common-
law requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages,’ for example, plainly have no place 
in the federal fraud statutes.”). 
 15. See United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 16. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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of criminal law that contained many civil libertarian features.  Three such 
features that resided within the substantive criminal law were the mens rea 
requirement, the absence of vicarious criminal liability, and the principle of 
legality. 
The mens rea requirement limited the state to punishing those who acted 
with a “guilty” mind; those who intentionally or recklessly engaged in 
prohibited conduct or produced a prohibited consequence.17  This limitation 
provided significant protection for individual liberty in two ways.  First, 
although “[a]cts can occur accidentally, . . . the state of mind that 
accompanies one’s act is entirely within the individual’s control. Thus, by 
recognizing mens rea as an indispensable element of crimes, we 
substantially increase the individual’s power to control his freedom from 
punishment.”18  Second, the burden of establishing what was in a 
defendant’s mind is often a significant hurdle for the prosecution to 
overcome.19 
Additional protection for individual liberty arose from permitting 
punishment only for an individual’s own actions.20  In the words of a 
contemporary commentator, vicarious criminal liability, “by departing from 
the ordinary principles of causation and from the fundamental, intensely 
personal, basis of criminal liability, violates the most deep-rooted traditions 
of criminal law.  Vicarious liability is a conception repugnant to every 
instinct of the criminal jurist.”21  As a result, “[w]hile the civil courts were. 
. . evolving [respondeat superior] during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. . . in the law of torts, no such development took place in the 
criminal law.”22  
Another significant substantive protection for liberty was embodied in 
                                                          
 17. Actually, criminal culpability required not merely mens rea, but the convergence of 
actus reus and mens rea.  This meant that the state could punish for neither actions nor 
thoughts alone. Like the mens rea requirement, the actus reus requirement serves a civil 
libertarian function by preventing the state from pursuing “thought-crimes” and 
criminalizing unpopular religious, political or cultural beliefs.  Although this feature of the 
criminal law is highly relevant in the context of attempt and other inchoate crimes, see, e.g., 
John Hasnas, Once More Unto the Breach:   The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law 
and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 57-61 (2002), it is not of 
central relevance in the context of white collar crime. 
 18. Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts—Legality and the Legal 
Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 668 (1969). 
 19. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing the history of mens rea and the ambiguity inherent in the concept, making it 
hard to define and prove). 
 20. One could, of course, be prosecuted as an accomplice, but that was for one’s own 
actions in aiding or abetting another’s criminal activity. 
 21. Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another:   Development of 
the Doctrine Respondeat Superior, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (1930). 
 22. Id. at 694.  The possible exceptions to this rule in England were criminal nuisance 
and libel.  However, neither of these applied in the United States.  LAFAVE, supra note 10, 
at 695 n.5. 
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the principle of legality.  Frequently encapsulated in the Latin phrase, 
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment 
without law), the principle of legality holds that “conduct is not criminal 
unless forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such conduct is 
criminal.”23  The principle is operationalized in the form of four corollaries:  
(1) a ban on retroactive criminal lawmaking; (2) a ban on the judicial 
creation of new common law crimes; (3) a requirement that a criminal 
offense is clearly enough defined to give citizens adequate notice of what 
conduct is prohibited and to establish clear guidelines governing law 
enforcement; and (4) a requirement that the language of a criminal offense 
be strictly construed in favor of the defendant (the rule of lenity).24  All 
four corollaries “are reflective of the central values of liberal societies”25 in 
that they serve to ensure that “people are entitled to know what they are 
forbidden to do so that they may shape their conduct accordingly . . . [and] 
to eliminate the oppressive and arbitrary exercise of official discretion.”26  
The latter two corollaries, which are the ones of concern in the present 
context, place significant limits on both the breadth of the criminal statutes 
that the legislature may enact and the range of application of those that are 
duly enacted. 
Many procedural protections for liberty also evolved.  The most famous 
of these are the twin requirements that the accused is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty, and that the state must establish the accused’s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt.  The presumption of innocence means that the 
innocence of the defendant is assumed and that the state bears the burden of 
introducing evidence sufficient to establish every element of a criminal 
offense.27  The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt sets the bar 
that the state must surmount to establish these elements exceedingly high.  
Taken together, these requirements make it quite difficult for the state to 
deprive a citizen of his or her liberty or property.  This reflects the inherent 
liberalism of Anglo-American criminal law that was captured by 
Blackstone in his oft-quoted statement that “the law holds, that it is better 
                                                          
 23. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 11; see also JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 1960) (stating that conduct is only criminal if it is described in 
criminal law); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW:   THE GENERAL PART 575 (2d ed. 
1961) (defining the principle of legality as the concept that crime and punishment must be in 
accordance with the law). 
 24. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 11 (illuminating these four collieries and their effect 
on American laws); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 39-40 (describing in detail the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege). 
 25. DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 39. 
 26. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 80 (1968). 
 27. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (2004) (stating that “[n]o person may be 
convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.”). 
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that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer,”28 and echoed 
in the Supreme Court’s declarations that “[t]he principle that there is a 
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, 
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law”29 and that,  
use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the 
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal 
law.  It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted 
by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men 
are being condemned.  It is also important in our free society that every 
individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his 
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without 
convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty.30 
Other procedural safeguards evolved as well, two of which—the 
common law attorney-client privilege,31 and the Fifth Amendment right not 
to be compelled to be a witness against oneself32—are particularly relevant 
to the present consideration.  Both of these provisions protect individual 
liberty by creating obstacles to criminal conviction.  Both place accurate 
and potentially incriminating information beyond the reach of the 
prosecutor.  The former creates a zone of privacy within which citizens 
may impart information to their counsel for the purpose of receiving legal 
advice without thereby manufacturing evidence against themselves.  The 
latter ensures that the state honor the requirement of the presumption of 
innocence by “forc[ing] the government not only to establish its case, but to 
do so by its own resources. It prohibits the state from easing its burden of 
proof by simply calling the defendant as its witness and forcing him to 
make the prosecution’s case.”33  By placing the techniques of the 
Inquisition and the Star Chamber  beyond the reach of the state, the right 
against self-incrimination embodies the most significant protection of 
individual liberty bequeathed to us by the common law.34 
                                                          
 28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1765). 
 29. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
 30. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  Other procedural features such as the 
right to trial by a jury in which conviction requires a unanimous verdict further reinforce the 
liberal bias of the criminal law.  Id. 
 31. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (describing the 
attorney-client privilege as one of the oldest recognized rights). 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 33. JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 26 (1985). 
 34. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:   THE RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 332 (1986) (Oxford Univ. Press 1968). 
The right implied a humane or ethical standard in judging a person accused of 
crime, regardless how heinous the crime or strong the evidence of his guilt. It 
reflected consideration for the human personality in that respect, but it also 
reflected the view that society benefited by seeking his conviction without the aid 
of his involuntary admissions. Forcing self-incrimination was thought not only to 
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These seven features—(1) the mens rea requirement, (2) the absence of 
vicarious criminal liability, (3) the principle of legality, (4) the presumption 
of innocence, (5) the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, (6) the 
attorney-client privilege, and (7) the privilege against self-incrimination—
reflect the inherent liberalism of American criminal law at the dawn of the 
twentieth century.  This liberalism, which bestowed the benefit of 
protection against governmental overreaching upon citizens, was not 
without cost, however.  By making it more difficult for the prosecution to 
obtain convictions, the liberal features of the criminal law reduced its 
deterrent value and thereby reduced its effectiveness in suppressing crime.  
Thus, Anglo-American criminal law purchased citizens’ protection against 
erroneous or abusive governmental action at the cost of citizens’ reduced 
protection against the criminal activity of their fellows. 
In the context of white collar crime, the cost imposed by the liberal 
features of the criminal law is especially high.  To see why, imagine what 
the position of a federal prosecutor charged with combating white collar 
crime would be if he or she were burdened with the substantive and 
procedural safeguards of the traditional criminal law.  First, consider the 
effect that the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt would have on his or her efforts.  Like all real-
world prosecutors, our imaginary one would be acutely aware of the 
limitations on his or her investigative and prosecutorial resources.  Policing 
all of the business concerns in the United States not only for honest 
dealing, but for compliance with the myriad regulations that carry criminal 
penalties is a truly  monumental task.  No matter how large the DOJ’s 
budget for white collar crime may be, it would still be insufficient to 
address anything beyond the tip of the iceberg of potential offenses.  
Furthermore, white collar crime typically consists of deceptive behavior.  
There is usually no corpus delicti or smoking gun to introduce into 
evidence.  White collar criminal activity is intentionally designed to be 
indistinguishable from non-criminal activity.  As a result, considerable 
investigation may be required merely to establish that a crime has been 
committed.  Even then, unraveling the deception may require a great deal 
of legal and/or accounting sophistication.  Under these circumstances, 
                                                          
brutalize the system of criminal justice but to produce weak and untrustworthy 
evidence. 
Above all, the right was most closely linked to freedom of religion and speech . . . .  
In the broadest sense it was a protection not of the guilty, or of the innocent, but of 
freedom of expression, of political liberty, of the right to worship as one pleased.  
In sum, its subtle and slow emergence in English law was, in the words of Dean 
Erwin N. Griswold, “one of the great landmarks of man’s struggle to make himself 
civilized,” “an expression of the moral striving of the community,” and “an ever-
present reminder of our belief in the importance of the individual.” 
Id. (quoting ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY; THREE SPEECHES 1 (1955)). 
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compliance with procedural rules that require “the government not only to 
establish its case, but to do so by its own resources”35 can be an extremely 
expensive proposition.  The assets that our imaginary prosecutor must 
expend to satisfy such liberal safeguards in each case he or she brings 
greatly reduce the total number of cases he or she can afford to bring.  This, 
in turn, significantly reduces the deterrent value of the statutes he or she is 
charged with enforcing.  Thus, in the context of white collar crime, the law 
enforcement costs of the presumption of innocence and requirement of 
proof beyond reasonable doubt are inordinately high. 
Next, consider the burden the mens rea requirement places on our 
prosecutor in the absence of vicarious criminal liability.  Without vicarious 
liability, he or she could only prosecute individuals for offenses they 
personally commit.  Thus, in order to obtain a conviction, the prosecutor 
would have to establish that the individual defendant acted with the 
requisite mens rea, which means proving that the defendant intentionally or 
recklessly engaged in or authorized dishonest business practices or the 
violation of regulations.  When an individual acts alone or with a small 
number of confederates, this requirement may not present an inordinate 
problem.  In the corporate context, however, evidence of mens rea can be 
difficult, and in some cases impossible, to obtain.  It is in the nature of the 
corporate form to diffuse decision-making responsibility.  Decisions made 
by one member of a firm may not be fully informed by what other 
members of the firm are doing or have decided.  As the courts have noted, 
“[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of 
specific duties and operations into smaller components.”36  Further, 
corporations frequently take actions that were never explicitly known to, or 
authorized by, any identifiable individual or individuals within the firm. 
“Complex business structures, characterized by decentralization and 
delegation of authority, commonly adopted by corporations for business 
purposes, make it difficult to identify the particular corporate agents 
responsible for . . . violations.”37  Accordingly, without vicarious criminal 
liability, the mens rea requirement will often present our hypothetical 
prosecutor with an insurmountable barrier to successful prosecutions. 
The principle of legality can also pose special problems for our 
prosecutor’s efforts.  Legality requires both that criminal offenses be 
defined clearly enough to give citizens adequate warning of what conduct 
is prohibited, and that criminal statutes be narrowly construed.  The 
problem this causes is that the more definite the law is as to what conduct is 
prohibited, the more guidance it provides to what former Chief Justice 
                                                          
 35. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 26.   
 36. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 37. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972). 
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Burger referred to as “the ever-inventive American ‘con artist’”38 to come 
up with “new varieties of fraud”39 that are not technically illegal.  Further, 
because the rule of lenity requires the narrow construction of criminal 
statutes, it creates loopholes in the fabric of the law against deceptive and 
fraudulent conduct through which these con artists can squeeze dishonest 
practices.40  This results in a running battle between those who would 
exploit the loopholes and Congress, which must continually pass new 
specific legislation to close them.41  Meanwhile, many forms of dishonest 
or deceptive behavior would remain beyond the reach of our imaginary 
prosecutor. 
The greatest challenge our prosecutor would face, however, is likely to 
be presented by the attorney-client privilege and the right against self-
incrimination.  As noted above, because white collar crime consists 
primarily of crimes of deception,42 the type of physical evidence associated 
with traditional criminal activity is rarely available.  The evidence upon 
which conviction for a white collar offense must rest will be almost entirely 
documentary in nature, and will consist predominantly of the business 
records of the firm for which the defendant works.  But to the extent that 
these records are in the personal possession of the defendant, contain 
communications between the defendant or other members of the firm and 
corporate counsel, or are the work product of corporate counsel, the right 
against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege render them 
unavailable to the prosecution.  To a much greater extent than is the case 
with regard to traditional criminal activity, the evidence necessary for a 
conviction for a white collar criminal offense will be in the hands of those 
who cannot be compelled to produce it.  This once again places our 
beleaguered prosecutor in an unenviable position. 
Viewed from the perspective of the early Twentieth Century, then, these 
four problems—limited investigative and prosecutorial resources, the 
difficulty of establishing mens rea, the loopholes created by narrowly 
construed statutes, and the difficulty of obtaining necessary documentary 
evidence—would constitute the chief impediments to the effective 
enforcement of white collar criminal statutes.  For the federal government 
to mount a successful campaign to suppress such crime, the criminal law 
would have to evolve ways to overcome these problems.  And this is 
                                                          
 38. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 406 (commenting on how the Mail Fraud Statute is a stop-gap for new 
criminal activity, giving time for Congress to develop new laws for new types of fraud). 
 41. See id. at 405-08 (mentioning the burden placed on Congress to enact laws quickly 
enough to counteract new types of white collar crime). 
 42. See HAZEL CROALL, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1 (Mike Maguire ed., 
2001). 
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precisely what happened.  To overcome the problem of limited police 
resources, the law evolved so as to conscript businesses and business 
people into the role of deputy law enforcement agents.  To overcome the 
difficulty of establishing mens rea, the law evolved to allow punishment in 
the absence of proof of intentional wrongdoing by specific individuals.  To 
overcome the problem of statutory loopholes, the law evolved broader, 
inchoate versions of traditional offenses and entirely new “secondary” 
offenses.43  And to overcome the difficulty of obtaining necessary 
documentary evidence, the law evolved mechanisms for circumventing 
common law and constitutional privileges. 
There were three main vehicles for the evolution of these solutions:  
(1) the concept of corporate criminal responsibility; (2) the legislative 
creation of new offenses; and (3) the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations.44  Hence, let us 
examine each of them in turn. 
2. The solutions 
a. Corporate criminal responsibility 
Corporations, like all businesses, are abstract entities.  They have no 
minds in which to form intentions, no hearts in which to conceive a guilty 
will, and no bodies that can be imprisoned or corporeally punished in 
response to bad behavior.  They have no actual existence apart from the 
human beings of which they are comprised.  How then can corporations be 
subject to criminal punishment in contradistinction to (and often in addition 
to) their individual members?  How can there be corporate as opposed to 
individual criminal responsibility? 
This was the question confronting the Supreme Court in 1909, when it 
decided New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.45  
In that case, an assistant manager of the railroad company had given illegal 
rebates in contravention of the Elkins Act.46  Both the manager and the 
railroad company were convicted of violating the Act.47  The railroad 
appealed its conviction, arguing that holding the corporation liable both 
violated the presumption of innocence of the directors and shareholders of 
                                                          
 43. By secondary offenses, I mean offenses such as money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1956-1967 (2004), obstruction of justice,  18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, and false 
statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, that consist of conduct that makes it more difficult for the 
government to succeed in the prosecution of other, substantive offenses. 
 44. U.S.C.G., supra note 1, ch. 8. 
 45. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). 
 46. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1466, 1467-70 
(1978). 
 47. New York Central, 212 U.S. at 492. 
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the company, and improperly imposed vicarious criminal liability on the 
shareholders who were innocent of wrongdoing.48  In addressing these 
contentions, the Court recognized that under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior, corporations could be held liable in tort for the actions of their 
agents taken within the scope of their employment.49  The Court found that 
such vicarious liability was justified not “because the principal actually 
participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is done for the 
benefit of the principal . . . and justice requires that the latter shall be held 
responsible for damages to the individual who has suffered by such 
conduct.”50  The Court then proceeded to “go only a step farther” and, “in 
the interest of public policy,” permit corporations to be held criminally 
liable for the actions of their agents as well.51  The Court was quite explicit 
in identifying the public policy interest that required such an expansion of 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, declaring that if “corporations may not 
be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of 
their agents, . . . many offenses might go unpunished.”52  Thus, 
[w]hile the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of 
corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to 
the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern times 
are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate 
commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity 
from all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a 
corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the only 
means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the 
abuses aimed at.53 
This constitutes a fairly direct statement that the reason the liberal 
protections of the presumption of innocence and the ban on vicarious 
criminal liability must be overridden is that, otherwise, federal statutes 
aimed at the suppression of white collar crime would be unenforceable. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the same rationale sixty-one 
years later when it decided United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.54  In that 
case, one of the hotel chain’s purchasing agents threatened to withhold the 
hotel’s business from a supplier in contravention of the Sherman Act55 
despite such action being against the hotel’s official policy and despite the 
purchasing agent having been given explicit instructions not to engage in 
                                                          
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 493. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 494. 
 52. Id. at 494-95. 
 53. Id. at 495-96. 
 54. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (prohibiting contracts or conspiracies to restrain interstate 
commerce or trade). 
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such conduct.56  The court nevertheless held the corporation liable “for the 
acts of its agents in the scope of their employment, even though contrary to 
general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent.”57  The court 
justified this apparently inescapable form of vicarious liability on the 
ground that, 
[c]omplex business structures, characterized by decentralization and 
delegation of authority, commonly adopted by corporations for business 
purposes, make it difficult to identify the particular corporate agents 
responsible for Sherman Act violations. . . . 
In sum, identification of the particular agents responsible for a Sherman 
Act violation is especially difficult, and their conviction and punishment 
is peculiarly ineffective as a deterrent. At the same time, conviction and 
punishment of the business entity itself is likely to be both appropriate 
and effective.58 
Once again, this constitutes a rather frank admission that vicarious criminal 
liability is necessary for the effective enforcement of federal statutes 
designed to regulate business behavior. 
Although corporations are thus criminally responsible for the actions of 
all of their employees taken within the scope of their employment, 
corporate criminal responsibility is not limited to such cases.  As pointed 
out in United States v. Bank of New England,59 corporations are also 
criminally responsible for the collective actions of all of their employees.60  
In Bank of New England, the bank was convicted of violating the Currency 
Transaction Reporting Act61 for failing to file the required reports when 
one of the bank’s customers made several withdrawals that collectively 
totaled more than $10,000.62  The bank appealed a jury instruction equating 
the bank’s knowledge with “the sum of the knowledge of all of the 
employees.”63  The trial judge instructed the jury that, 
if Employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement, B 
knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows them 
all.  So if you find that an employee within the scope of his employment 
knew that CTRs had to be filed, even if multiple checks are used, the 
                                                          
 56. See Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1004 (adding that the purchasing agent’s decision to 
violate Hilton Hotel’s policy resulted from “anger and personal pique toward the individual 
representing the supplier.”). 
 57. Id. at 1007. 
 58. Id. at 1006. 
 59. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 60. Id. at 855. 
 61. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2001). 
 62. See Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 846 (summarizing the bank’s conviction of 
thirty-one violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act, which requires a bank to 
file a Currency Transaction Report within fifteen days of customer transactions greater than 
$10,000). 
 63. Id. at 855 (quoting the trial judge’s explanation of collective knowledge). 
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bank is deemed to know it. The bank is also deemed to know it if each of 
several employees knew a part of that requirement and the sum of what 
the separate employees knew amounted to knowledge that such a 
requirement existed.64 
The court upheld this instruction as proper stating, 
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context 
of corporate criminal liability.  The acts of a corporation are, after all, 
simply the acts of all of its employees operating within the scope of their 
employment. . . .  Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, 
subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller 
components.  The aggregate of those components constitutes the 
corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation.  It is irrelevant 
whether employees administering one component of an operation know 
the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the 
operation . . . .  [“T]he corporation is considered to have acquired the 
collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their 
failure to act accordingly.[”]65 
Therefore, a corporation can be guilty of an offense even though no 
individual member of the firm has committed any crime.  Such a result is 
difficult to explain on any basis other than the absolute necessity of 
vicarious criminal liability to the effectiveness of the regulatory legislation. 
Consider the extent to which this conception of corporate criminal 
responsibility solves our hypothetical prosecutor’s problems.  In the first 
place, it eases his or her struggle with limited resources by shifting a 
significant portion of the cost of crime prevention from the government to 
the corporations themselves.  Under the rules of New York Central and 
Hilton Hotels, the only way for a firm to avoid criminal liability is to 
constantly monitor the behavior of all of its employees to ensure that none 
of them intentionally or recklessly violates the law.66  Actual monitoring is 
required because merely having corporate policies or issuing explicit 
instructions against violating the law is not sufficient to protect the firm 
from conviction.  Further, under the rule of Bank of New England, firms 
must continually review all corporate activities to ensure that no laws are 
unintentionally violated as a result of the ill-informed or poorly-
coordinated actions of the companies’ various employees.  Thus, this 
conception of corporate criminal responsibility goes a long way toward 
enlisting corporations as deputy law enforcement agencies. 
This form of corporate criminal responsibility also helps the prosecutor 
                                                          
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 856 (quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 
(W.D. W. Va. 1974)). 
 66. Actually, the corporation is often required to ensure that none of its employees 
negligently breaks the law as well.  See infra text accompanying notes 117-120. 
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overcome the problem posed by the mens rea requirement.  Even under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, the prosecutor would still have to present 
evidence proving that at least one employee intentionally or recklessly 
violated the law—something that can be difficult to do in the corporate 
context.67  But Bank of New England’s collective knowledge doctrine frees 
the prosecutor from this constraint.  Because the corporation will be 
deemed to have the sum total of the knowledge of all of its employees, the 
prosecutor need only prove that it was possible for the corporation to 
assemble the required knowledge to establish corporate mens rea.  As a 
scienter requirement, this borders on the oxymoronic since it implies that a 
company that not only does not have knowledge in fact, but is not even 
negligent in failing to assemble it, can nevertheless act knowingly.  But it 
has the prosecutorial virtue of converting unintentional individual conduct 
into intentional corporate conduct.  Thus, by relieving the prosecutor of the 
burden of proving intent, this conception of corporate criminal 
responsibility eliminates one of the major hurdles to the successful 
prosecution of white collar offenses. 
Finally, the ability to hold business vicariously liable for the offenses of 
their employees helps our prosecutor overcome the impediment that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination poses to his or her 
efforts to obtain evidence.  To see how, consider that in the 1906 case of 
Hale v. Henkel,68 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege did not apply to corporations.  This was a perfectly sensible 
decision at the time since, coming as it did three years before New York 
Central, corporations were not subject to criminal punishment.  After all, 
what would be the point in holding that an entity that could not be 
prosecuted had a right against self-incrimination?  The situation changed 
when, three years later, corporations became liable to the criminal sanction.  
The point of extending the Fifth Amendment privilege to corporations then 
became precisely the same as it is with regard to individuals, to preserve 
the liberal character of the criminal law embodied in the presumption of 
innocence that “prohibits the state from easing its burden of proof by 
simply calling the defendant as its witness and forcing him to make the 
prosecution’s case.”69  The Court, however, never revisited the issue with 
this in mind, but simply continued to cite Hale for what became known as 
the collective entity rule—the proposition that “for purposes of the Fifth 
                                                          
 67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. 
 68. 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (stating, “[W]e are of the opinion that there is a clear 
distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has 
no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the 
state.”); see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (explaining that “Hale 
settled that a corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege.”). 
 69. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 26. 
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Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated 
differently from individuals.”70 
The advent of corporate criminal responsibility, then, created a new class 
of defendant shorn of the right against self-incrimination.  This was a boon 
to white collar prosecutors in two ways.  First, in cases against corporate 
defendants, prosecutors could subpoena whatever documentary evidence 
they desired without fear that the subpoena would be resisted on Fifth 
Amendment grounds.  Second, in cases against individual defendants 
employed by corporations or other collective entities, prosecutors could 
circumvent the defendants’ personal Fifth Amendment rights by issuing 
subpoenas to them in their corporate capacity.  That is, by issuing a 
subpoena to John Doe, Employee of ABC Corporation, rather than merely 
to John Doe in his personal capacity, prosecutors could compel an 
individual to produce corporate documents that would be used as evidence 
against him personally.  As the Court explained, “[t]he plain mandate of 
these decisions is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed 
to the corporation, or . . . to the individual in his capacity as a custodian, a 
corporate custodian . . . may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on 
Fifth Amendment grounds.”71  Indeed, the Court was quite explicit that the 
rationale for thus limiting the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege was 
that it was necessary for the effective enforcement of the statutes directed 
against white collar crime. 
We note further that recognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf 
of the records custodians of collective entities would have a detrimental 
impact on the Government’s efforts to prosecute “white-collar crime,” 
one of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement 
authorities.  “The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an 
organization or its representatives is usually found in the official records 
and documents of that organization.  Were the cloak of the privilege to 
be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective 
enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible.”72 
There should be nothing surprising about the evolution of corporate 
                                                          
 70. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104. 
 71. Id. at 108-09. 
 72. Id. at 115.  Ironically, in the earlier case of Bellis v. United States, the Court 
justified its refusal to allow individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege with 
respect to corporate documents on the grounds that “recognition of the individual’s claim of 
privilege with respect to the financial records of the organization would substantially 
undermine the unchallenged rule that the organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth 
Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such 
organizations.”  417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974).  Thus, the very existence of the theoretically 
ungrounded collective entity rule is offered as a justification for denying individuals the 
protection of the right against self-incrimination, as is the fact that if it is not curtailed, the 
right would effectively perform its intended function of limiting the means by which the 
government may exercise its regulatory power. 
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criminal responsibility, and I am certainly not suggesting that there was any 
nefarious agency at work in its development.  Rather, the current 
conception of corporate criminal responsibility should be seen as the 
logical outgrowth of the effort to police the business environment for 
honest dealing and regulatory violations.  For the federal government to 
wage a successful campaign against white collar crime, it had to find a way 
to circumvent the civil libertarian features inherent in the traditional 
criminal law.  The conception of corporate criminal responsibility that 
arose in the context of that campaign is well-designed to serve that end.  It 
reverses the presumption of innocence by conclusively presuming the firm 
to be guilty not only of any crime committed by its individual employees in 
the scope of their employment, but also of any crime that could have been 
committed if the firm had assembled the requisite collective knowledge, 
whether or not it did so.  This advances the campaign against white collar 
crime by shifting a large amount of the costs of both crime prevention and 
investigation from the government to businesses, which can now avoid 
criminal liability only by continually monitoring the behavior of its 
individual employees and by auditing the diverse particles of information 
possessed by each.  Corporate criminal responsibility also eliminates the 
burden of establishing corporate mens rea in the form of a collective, 
corporate intention to engage in criminal activity by imputing the intention 
of any of its agents to the corporation even when the agent is acting 
contrary to corporate policy or instructions, and by converting the 
unintentional and uncoordinated actions of the firm’s individual employees 
into the intentional action of the firm.  And finally, because businesses 
have no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, corporate 
criminal responsibility opens the door to evidence that would otherwise be 
constitutionally unavailable to prosecutors. 
b. New offenses 
Even with the advantages of corporate criminal responsibility, a federal 
prosecutor engaged in the campaign against white collar crime would still 
face an uphill battle.  Traditional criminal law required that criminal 
offenses be defined with sufficient clarity to put the ordinary person on 
notice as to what conduct was prohibited.  But in the context of white collar 
crime, which consists primarily of crimes of deception, such clarity would 
instruct criminals in the best way to skirt the law.  In such cases, proving 
every element of an offense, especially mens rea, beyond reasonable doubt 
would be a very arduous task.  To wage a successful war on white collar 
crime, a federal prosecutor would need more weapons than the criminal 
law traditionally provides. 
These weapons arrived in the form of the legislative creation and 
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expansive judicial interpretation of new criminal offenses.73  Specifically, 
Congress passed, and the federal courts endorsed, criminal statutes creating 
offenses of broad scope, or with reduced mens rea requirements, or that 
consisted entirely of actions that make it more difficult for the government 
to prosecute other substantive offenses.  Each of these types of new offense 
made the life of a federal prosecutor considerably easier. 
Consider first the broadly-defined substantive offenses, of which the 
various federal fraud statutes and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO),74 can serve as useful examples.  Mail fraud,75 
which is probably the archetypical white collar criminal offense, has 
already been mentioned.76   The traditional conception of criminal fraud 
consisted of one party obtaining the property of another on the basis of an 
intentional misrepresentation of a material fact upon which the victim 
relied.77  This required the prosecution to establish that:  (1) the defendant 
had obtained the property of another; (2) the defendant had knowingly 
made a false representation of fact; (3) the fact was material; and (4) the 
victim relied on the false representation in transferring the property.  The 
federal mail fraud statute, in contrast, consists of any scheme or artifice to 
defraud that involves the use of the mails.  To establish a scheme or artifice 
to defraud, the prosecution is required to prove only that the defendant 
participated in “any deliberate plan of action or course of conduct by which 
someone intends to deceive or to cheat another of something of value.”78  
The prosecution need not prove that the scheme was designed to obtain the 
property of another because the statute defines scheme or artifice to defraud 
to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services.”79  It need prove neither that the defendant actually 
obtained the property of the victim or deprived the victim of the intangible 
right of honest services nor that the victim relied on any representation of 
the defendant because “[b]y prohibiting the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather 
than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would 
                                                          
 73. It has been noted, for example, that “[d]uring the past century, both Congress and 
the Supreme Court have repeatedly placed their stamps of approval on expansive use of the 
mail fraud statute. Indeed, each of the five legislative revisions of the statute has served to 
enlarge its coverage.”  Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. 
REV. 771, 772 (1980). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (2003). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2002). 
 76. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements for the 
crime of mail fraud and its implications in practice).  The comments that follow should be 
understood as applying to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, 
health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, as well as to 
mail fraud.  The requirement of a scheme or artifice to defraud is common to them all. 
 77. See supra note 10.  
 78. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 47.13 
(5th ed. 2000). 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
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clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.”80  Thus, “[t]he 
common-law requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages’ . . . 
plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes.”81  And finally, the 
prosecution need not prove that there was a misrepresentation of fact 
because, 
under the mail fraud statute, it is just as unlawful to speak ‘half truths’ or 
to omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.  The 
statements need not be false or fraudulent on their face, and the accused 
need not misrepresent any fact, since all that is necessary is that the 
scheme be reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence 
and comprehension.82 
To describe the scope of the mail fraud statute as broad may be a bit of 
an understatement.  Indeed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
declared “the potential reach of [the mail fraud statute] is virtually 
limitless,”83 pointing out that, 
a customer who importunes an employee to allow her to use the 
company’s telephone access code to make an important long-distance 
telephone call, in the face of a written company policy expressly 
prohibiting non-employees from using the access code, could 
conceivably fall within the scope of the statute if read literally.  So too 
could an employee’s use of his company’s letterhead to lend authority to 
a letter of complaint mailed to the employee’s landlord in disregard of 
the company’s code of conduct prohibiting the use of the company’s 
letterhead for non-company business.84 
Thus, in addition to the cases already mentioned in which the government 
brought mail fraud charges against a developer who falsely claimed its 
homes were good investments,85 and a physician who failed to disclose to 
his patients that he received a fee for referring them to a hospital,86 it has 
                                                          
 80. Neder, 527 U.S. at 25. 
 81. Id. at 24-25. 
 82. United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 585 (5th 1982).  The prosecution must also 
establish the use of the mails, but this requires neither that United States mails actually be 
used nor that the message sent be false or misleading in any way.  The mailing may be sent 
either by the Postal Service or by “any private or commercial interstate carrier,” 18 U.S.C. § 
1341, and “[i]t is sufficient for the mailing to be ‘incidental to an essential part of the 
scheme,’ or ‘a step in the plot.’”  Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989).  
Thus, “‘innocent’ mailings—ones that contain no false information–may supply the mailing 
element . . . [and] the Court has found the elements of mail fraud to be satisfied where the 
mailings have been routine.”  Id. at 715. 
 83. United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 84. Id. 
 85. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996); see supra note 15 and 
accompanying text (discussing Brown as an example of the coverage of the mail fraud 
statute). 
 86. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996); see supra note 16 and 
accompanying text (analyzing Jain as an example of the extent of the mail fraud statute). 
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also brought charges against a county commissioner who threatened to 
distribute a compromising videotape of a candidate for another seat on the 
board,87 a man who secretly lobbied his brother—a United States Senator—
on behalf of a corporation,88 and an IRS employee who looked at 
confidential tax returns in contravention of IRS policy.89 
Perhaps the best illustration of the breadth of the federal fraud statutes is 
the recent prosecution of Martha Stewart.  Prosecutors charged Stewart 
with securities fraud for publicly and falsely asserting her innocence of 
trading stocks on non-public information.90  Stewart, who sold her shares of 
ImClone stock immediately prior to a sharp decline in its price, publicly 
asserted that she did so in response to a pre-established stop-loss order 
rather than on the basis of a tip from her broker based on non-public 
information.91  Because “Martha Stewart’s reputation, as well as the 
likelihood of any criminal or regulatory action against Stewart, were 
material to Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (“MSLO”) 
shareholders because of the negative impact that any such action or damage 
to her reputation could have on the company which bears her name,”92 the 
government charged her with securities fraud for attempting to 
stop or at least slow the steady erosion of MSLO’s stock price caused by 
investor concerns [by making or causing] to be made a series of false and 
misleading public statements during June 2002 regarding her sale of 
ImClone stock on December 27, 2001 that concealed that Stewart had 
been provided [non-public] information . . . and that Stewart had sold her 
ImClone stock while in possession of that information.93 
The government brought this indictment against Stewart despite the fact 
that it did not charge her with insider trading.  Thus, the scope of the 
securities fraud statute is sufficiently broad to allow the indictment of high 
profile corporate executives for publicly declaring their innocence of 
offenses that they are not even charged with committing.  From this 
example, one can see why the former Chief of Business Frauds Prosecution 
for the Southern District of New York would declare that “[t]o federal 
prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius, 
                                                          
 87. United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1165 (11th Cir. 1997) (charging 
defendant under the mail fraud statute for “depriv[ing] the citizens . . . of Florida of their 
intangible right to [the defendant’s] honest services . . . in her capacity as Lee County 
Commissioner.”). 
 88. United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 89. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997).  This case involved a 
conviction for wire fraud, rather than mail fraud. 
 90. Indictment, United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717, ¶ 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 
2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspb60403 ind.pdf. 
 91. Id. ¶ 60. 
 92. Id. ¶ 57. 
 93. Id. ¶ 60. 
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our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love.” 94 
Similarly, RICO creates federal offenses not known to the common law 
that significantly extend the reach of federal prosecutors.  RICO 
criminalizes the direct or indirect investment in, acquisition or maintenance 
of an interest in, or participation in the affairs of an enterprise that is 
engaged in or affects interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of 
racketeering activity, which is defined as the commission of two or more 
predicate offenses during a period of ten years.95  It also criminalizes the 
conspiracy to engage in such prohibited activity.96  Further, the predicate 
offenses constitute an extremely wide array of both state and federal 
offenses, including the opened-ended federal fraud statutes just discussed.97  
These provisions give federal prosecutors the power to go after virtually 
any form of group activity that involves the commission of, or merely the 
plans to commit, more than one criminal offense. 
In passing RICO, Congress was explicit that the statute’s purpose was to 
enhance federal law enforcement power, stating in its findings that it 
enacted the statute to remedy 
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the 
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring 
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful 
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions 
and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in 
scope and impact.98 
Indeed, Congress gave the courts explicit instructions to construe the 
statute broadly by including a provision that specifically calls for a liberal 
construction of RICO.99  The Supreme Court has heeded these instructions, 
stating that “RICO is to be read broadly.  This is the lesson not only of 
Congress’ self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, but 
also of its express admonition that RICO is to ‘be liberally construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes,’”100  Accordingly, the Court held that 
RICO’s application was not limited to the efforts of organized crime to 
infiltrate legitimate businesses, but may also be used against any 
                                                          
 94. Rakoff, supra note 73, at 771. 
 95. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (2000) (defining “racketeering activity” under the 
various RICO provisions, and prohibiting activities defined as racketeering). 
 96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (dictating that it is unlawful to conspire to violate RICO-
prohibited activities). 
 97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (defining racketeering activity to include mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and financial institution fraud). 
 98. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 
(1970). 
 99. See 84 Stat. at 947 (indicating that liberal construction is necessary to serve RICO’s 
remedial purpose). 
 100. See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985). 
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association of individuals that pursues criminal purposes.101  Thus, 
“RICO’s versatility has allowed RICO prosecutions for tax, securities, 
commodities, and bankruptcy fraud as well as for obscenity, drug, or 
gambling violations.”102 
Next, consider the myriad new regulatory offenses that require either no 
or a reduced level of mens rea.  Traditionally, criminal law required either 
intentional or reckless conduct to sustain a conviction for a crime.  There 
was no strict liability at common law,103 and many jurisdictions did not 
permit criminal convictions for negligent behavior.104  Among those that 
did, ordinary civil negligence could not sustain a criminal conviction.105  A 
more culpable form of negligence, criminal negligence, was required.  
Criminal negligence requires that “the negligence of the accused must be 
‘culpable,’ ‘gross,’ or ‘reckless,’ that is, the conduct of the accused must be 
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinary prudent or 
careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a 
proper regard for human life, or conduct amounting to an indifference to 
the consequences.”106 
This situation changed over the course of the Twentieth Century as 
Congress enacted regulatory statutes that created criminal offenses 
requiring no mens rea, and the courts upheld the legitimacy of these 
“public welfare offenses.”107  In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized 
that Congress was enacting “increasingly numerous and detailed 
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular 
industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or 
                                                          
 101. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576 (1981). 
 102. See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 
700-01 (1990). 
 103. The common law did, on occasion, permit “strict liability” with regard to legally 
required attendant circumstances when the act the defendant engaged in was inherently 
wrong.  See Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154 (Crown Cases Reserved 1875).  Thus, if 
one intentionally had intercourse with a young girl, it was not a defense to a charge of 
statutory rape that one did not know she was underage.  See People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52, 
57 (Cal. 1984).  However, the fact that neither knowledge nor negligence with regard to an 
attendant circumstance was required does not imply the offense was one of strict liability.  
The defendant was still required to intentionally produce the prohibited consequence.  Thus, 
in the case of statutory rape, the defendant had to intentionally engage in the act of 
intercourse.  Id. at 59. 
 104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 911 (Mass. 1944) (noting 
that “[t]here is in Massachusetts at common law no such thing as ‘criminal negligence.’”). 
 105. See State v. Barnett, 63 S.E.2d 57, 58-59 (S.C. 1951). 
 106. Id. at 59.  The Model Penal Code defines criminal negligence as involving a risk “of 
such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and 
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 107. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (upholding a statute 
punishing public welfare offenses that did not require a criminal intent). 
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welfare,”108 the violation of which “impairs the efficiency of controls 
deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted.”109  Because, 
with regard to such regulations, “whatever the intent of the violator, the 
injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to 
fortuity,”110 the Court endorsed “construing statutes and regulations which 
make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty 
act alone makes out the crime.”111  Thus, just as it did in recognizing 
corporate criminal responsibility, the Court justified relaxing one of the 
liberal features of the traditional criminal law, the mens rea requirement, on 
the ground that doing so was necessary to effectively police the business 
environment. 
Under the public welfare offense doctrine, businesses and individuals 
can be criminally punished for entirely innocent regulatory violations, at 
least when the potential penalty is relatively small.112  For example, a 
company that operated a tank farm near Boston Harbor was convicted of 
violating the Refuse Act113 when it allowed oil to seep into a part of Boston 
Harbor, despite the fact that the government made no allegation of a lack of 
care by the company, and the company “immediately undertook to clean up 
the oil and to trace its source . . . [and] worked diligently to divert or drain 
the accumulation.”114  Once again, this result was justified on the ground of 
law enforcement considerations.115 
Merely to attempt to formulate, let alone apply, [a mens rea 
requirement,] would be to risk crippling the Refuse Act as an 
enforcement tool . . . .  [I]t would be difficult indeed, and to no purpose, 
for the government to have to take issue with elaborate factual and 
theoretical arguments concerning who, why and what went wrong. . . .  
In the present circumstances we see no unfairness in predicating liability 
on actual non-compliance rather than either intentions or best efforts.116 
In addition to public welfare offenses, Congress authorized and the 
courts endorsed the imposition of substantial criminal punishment for 
regulatory violations resulting from ordinary, as opposed to criminal, 
negligence.  This development has allowed the criminal prosecution not 
                                                          
 108. Id. at 254. 
 109. Id. at 256. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. (providing that the public welfare doctrine applies where “penalties commonly 
are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”). 
 113. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1899) (making it illegal to 
discharge any type of refuse other than what flows from streets and sewers into any United 
States’ “navigable” water). 
 114. United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 621 (1st Cir. 1974). 
 115. See id. at 623 (explaining that society receives great benefit from easily defined, 
easily enforceable statutes). 
 116. Id. 
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only of employees who are themselves negligent, but also of their 
supervisors.  Thus, a roadmaster employed by a railway company to 
oversee the maintenance and construction of the track was sentenced to six 
months in prison, six months in a halfway house, six months of supervised 
release, and a $5,000 fine for violating the Clean Water Act117 when a 
backhoe operator on his crew negligently pierced an oil pipeline, causing a 
discharge of oil into a nearby river.118  The roadmaster, who was charged in 
keeping with “the stated policy of prosecutors in the past several 
administrations to seek to hold liable the highest level culpable officials of 
an entity that commits [white collar] criminal violations,”119 appealed, 
arguing that the government had to prove criminal, rather than ordinary, 
negligence.  The court rejected this argument, noting that  “[i]t is well 
established that a public welfare statute may subject a person to criminal 
liability for his or her ordinary negligence without violating due 
process.”120 
Finally, consider the recent creation of new “secondary” offenses; 
offenses that consist entirely of actions that make it more difficult for the 
government to prosecute other substantive criminal offenses.    
Traditionally, criminal offenses consisted of actions that either directly 
harmed or violated the rights of others, or were immoral in themselves.  
But as the campaign against white collar crime evolved, so too did offenses 
that consist in conduct that is perfectly innocent in itself, but that impedes 
or fails to aid the government’s efforts to prosecute white collar crime. 
As a first example, consider currency reporting and money laundering 
offenses.  Currency reporting offenses consist of the failure of financial 
institutions and other covered businesses to report transactions involving 
more than $10,000 to the federal government.121  Although there is nothing 
                                                          
 117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (prohibiting any discharge of oil or other hazardous 
material into the water of the United States). 
 118. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1119-20, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 119. Steven P. Solow & Ronald A. Sarachan, Criminal Negligence Prosecutions Under 
the Federal Clean Water Act:   A Statistical Analysis and the Evaluation of the Impact of 
Hanousek and Hong, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,153, 11,155 (2002). 
 120. Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121.  Although Hanousek is a rather recent decision, 
federal prosecutors have long presumed that the intent standard for the Clean Water Act is 
simple negligence.  Solow & Sarachan, supra note 119, at 11, 159.  Further, the courts have 
endorsed the prosecution of corporate officials for the ordinary negligence of their 
subordinates when those officials are responsible corporate officers.  United States v. Hong, 
242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001).  That is, officers who have the responsibility and 
authority to prevent or correct a violation by virtue of their position in the corporation can 
be criminally liable for actions of their subordinates.  United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 
673-74 (1975). 
 121. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2000) makes it a felony to willfully fail to file required currency 
transaction reports (CTRs).  31 U.S.C. § 1313 requires banks and financial institutions to 
report transactions of more than $10,000.  31 U.S.C. § 1316 requires casinos and persons 
moving currency in and out of the country to report transactions or currency movements of 
more than $10,000.  26 U.S.C. § 6050I(a) requires all persons receiving more than $10,000 
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illegal about engaging in a financial transaction involving more than 
$10,000, the government can use this information to help it identify those 
who may be engaging in criminal activity.  By criminalizing the failure to 
report such information to the government, the currency reporting statutes 
essentially make it a crime not to aid federal law enforcement efforts. 
Federal money laundering statutes criminalize the otherwise legal use of 
money obtained through criminal activity.  18 U.S.C. § 1956 makes it 
illegal to engage in any financial transactions with the proceeds of unlawful 
activity with the knowledge that the transaction is intended to conceal 
information about the funds.122  The courts have interpreted the language of 
this statute to mean that purchasing just about anything with money known 
to be the proceeds of unlawful activity will constitute a transaction 
designed to conceal information about the funds.  Thus, in United States v. 
Jackson,123 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the money 
laundering conviction of an alleged drug dealer for writing checks to 
purchase cell phones and pay his rent, and for cashing checks for small 
amounts at his local bank.124  18 U.S.C. § 1957 makes it illegal to engage in 
monetary transactions of more than $10,000 involving the proceeds of 
unlawful activity, regardless of the purpose for which the transaction is 
undertaken.125  Several federal circuits have interpreted this statute to cover 
the withdrawal of more than $10,000 from any account that contains at 
least $10,000 in unlawful proceeds, regardless of how much untainted 
money the accounts also contain.126  This provision criminalizes the use of 
more than $10,000 of one’s own money, regardless of its source, once it 
has been commingled with illegal proceeds.  The breadth of this statute is 
so great that it had to be amended in 1988 to permit criminal defendants to 
pay their attorneys.127  By thus making the otherwise innocent use of illegal 
proceeds a criminal offense in itself, the money laundering statutes expand 
the range of activities the government may investigate by an order of 
magnitude and greatly facilitate the government’s ability to trace suspected 
                                                          
in cash in the course of one’s business to file a report.  31 U.S.C. § 5324 makes it a felony 
for anyone to structure his or her financial transactions to avoid federal reporting 
requirements.  
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 123. 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 124. Id. at 841. 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). 
 126. See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the 
government does not have to prove that no untainted funds were involved in the transaction 
if the transaction originated from a single source of commingled lawful and unlawful 
money); see also United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
if the government was required to prove that no untainted funds were used, individuals 
could avoid prosecution by commingling illegitimate and legitimate funds). 
 127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (indicating that “the term ‘monetary transaction’ . . . 
does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as 
guaranteed by . . . the Constitution.”). 
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criminal activity.  In essence, these statutes make it a crime to make it more 
difficult for the government to detect one’s crimes.128 
A second example of the new secondary offenses is the crime of making 
false statements to federal investigators.  18 U.S.C. § 1001 makes it a 
felony to lie to or otherwise deceptively conceal material information from 
officials investigating any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal 
government.  This offense may be committed whenever an individual 
responds to a question from a federal investigator, regardless of whether he 
or she is under oath.  Under § 1001, it can be a crime simply to deny one’s 
guilt of an offense.  For example, a union official was convicted not only of 
accepting unlawful cash payments, but also of making a false statement for 
responding “no” when two FBI agents came to his home and asked him 
whether he had received such payments.129  In upholding the official’s 
conviction for making a false statement, the Supreme Court was clear about 
the breadth of the statute’s application, stating, “[b]y its terms, 18 U.S.C. § 
1001 covers “any” false statement–that is, a false statement ‘of whatever 
kind.’  The word ‘no’ in response to a question assuredly makes a 
‘statement.’”  Indeed, in rejecting the union official’s argument that an 
exception must be made for an “exculpatory no,” the Court explicitly 
recognized the power § 1001 places in the hands of federal prosecutors by 
stating, 
Petitioner repeats the argument made by many supporters of the 
“exculpatory no,” that the doctrine is necessary to eliminate the grave 
risk that § 1001 will become an instrument of prosecutorial abuse.  The 
supposed danger is that overzealous prosecutors will use this provision 
as a means of “piling on” offenses—sometimes punishing the denial of 
wrongdoing more severely than the wrongdoing itself.  The objectors’ 
principal grievance on this score, however, lies not with the hypothetical 
prosecutors but with Congress itself, which has decreed the obstruction 
of a legitimate investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious 
one.130 
A final example of this type of offense can be supplied by the statutes 
prohibiting obstruction of justice.131  18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1505 prohibit 
any efforts to corruptly influence, obstruct or impede any federal judicial or 
administrative proceeding or legislative inquiry.  In addition, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
                                                          
 128. The secondary offense, incidentally, often carries a greater penalty than the 
underlying substantive offense.  See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARAH SUN BEALE, FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 397-98 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that the sentence 
for money laundering is almost four times greater than for the crime that generates the 
unlawful proceeds). 
 129. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998). 
 130. Id. at 405. 
 131. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, 1519-1520 (listing the various 
obstruction of justice offenses). 
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1512, 1519, and 1520 prohibit any efforts to corruptly alter, destroy, 
mutilate, or conceal documents or other objects that might be relevant to 
any official proceeding or investigation of any federal department or 
agency.  The power and broad reach of these statutes is illustrated by the 
recent convictions of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm and Frank 
Quattrone, the high-profile investment banker for Credit Suisse First 
Boston Corporation (CSFB).  Andersen, which was the accounting firm 
employed to audit Enron’s books, was never charged with or convicted of 
any fraudulent practices or accounting irregularities.  Rather, the company 
was indicted for corruptly persuading and attempting to persuade its 
employees to alter and destroy documents related to a Securities and 
Exchange Commission investigation of Enron’s special purpose entities.132  
Andersen was convicted of violating § 1512 solely on the basis of in-house 
counsel Nancy Temple’s response to a draft memorandum concerning 
Andersen’s actions in response to an Enron press release characterizing 
certain losses as non-recurring.  The obstruction consisted of Temple’s 
recommendation to delete “some language that might suggest we have 
concluded the release is misleading . . . [when] in fact Andersen had 
concluded that the term ‘non-recurring’ was misleading.”133  Similarly, 
Quattrone, who was not charged with any substantive fraud, was convicted 
on three counts of obstruction of justice and sentenced to eighteen months 
in prison for forwarding another employee’s e-mail suggesting that CSFB’s 
employees comply with the company’s document retention policy and 
“catch up on file cleaning” with the added injunction, “having been a key 
witness in a securities litigation case in south texas [sic] i [sic] strongly 
advise you to follow these procedures.”134 
Clearly, false statements and obstruction of justice are offenses designed 
to aid federal law enforcement efforts.  Both offenses make it a separate 
crime for an individual to do anything that would make it more difficult for 
the government to convict that individual or anyone else of another 
substantive crime.  Neither offense requires, however, that there actually be 
any underlying substantive criminal activity.  One can be guilty of either 
offense without being guilty of anything else, as Martha Stewart’s recent 
convictions demonstrate.  Stewart was convicted of both false statements 
                                                          
 132. Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. H-02-121, 2002 WL 
32153945 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2002). 
 133. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Andersen’s Motion for a 
Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP (S.D. Tex. 
2002) (Cr. No. H-02-121) in JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 458 (2d 
ed. 2003). 
 134. Indictment, United States v. Quattrone, No. 03 Cr., ¶¶ 27-28 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 
2003) (charging Quattrone with obstruction of justice for promoting file destruction), 
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/csfb/usquattrone 51203ind.pdf. 
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and obstruction of justice in connection with statements she made to federal 
investigators during a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation 
of allegations of insider trading in shares of ImClone Systems Inc. stock.  
Stewart was never charged with insider trading, and, in fact, could not be 
because she was not an Imclone insider, she was not tipped by such an 
insider, and she did not breach any fiduciary duty to the source of the 
information, who was her broker and who recommended the trade to her.135  
Nevertheless, Stewart was charged with and convicted of making false 
statements and obstructing an agency investigation by providing a false 
account of the communications she had with her broker concerning the sale 
of her stock.136  Thus, these statutes empower prosecutors to go after not 
just criminals attempting to avoid detection and punishment, but anyone 
who interferes with a federal investigation regardless of the reason. 
The creation of these new offenses went a long way toward relieving the 
burden that the inherent liberalism of the traditional criminal law would 
have otherwise placed on federal prosecutors.  In the first place, the 
enactment of broadly-defined substantive offenses such as mail and wire 
fraud and RICO greatly ameliorated the inconveniences arising from the 
principle of legality’s requirement that criminal offenses be definitely 
defined and narrowly construed.  As a feature of the common law, the 
principle of legality may be overridden by statute as long as the legislation 
is not unconstitutionally vague.  Thus, Congress’ enactment of expansive, 
somewhat amorphous new offenses like the federal fraud offenses and 
                                                          
 135. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997). 
 136. Despite the impression given by press accounts of the verdict, Stewart was not 
convicted for lying about whether she sold her Imclone stock pursuant to a stop-loss order.  
United States v. Martha Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Specifically, 
[t]he jury found Stewart guilty of making the following false statements, each of 
which was a specification in Count Three of the Indictment.  Stewart told the 
Government investigators that she spoke to Bacanovic on December 27 and 
instructed him to sell her ImClone shares after he informed her that ImClone was 
trading below $60 per share.  Stewart also stated that during the same telephone 
call, she and Bacanovic discussed the performance of the stock of her own 
company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (“MSLO”), and discussed K-Mart.  
She told investigators that she had decided to sell her ImClone shares at that time 
because she did not want to be bothered during her vacation.  Stewart stated that 
she did not know if there was any record of a telephone message left by Bacanovic 
on December 27 in her assistant’s message log.  She also said that since December 
28, she had only spoken with Bacanovic once regarding ImClone, and they had 
only discussed matters in the public arena.  Finally, Stewart told investigators that 
since December 28, Bacanovic had told her that Merrill Lynch had been questioned 
by the SEC regarding ImClone, but that he did not tell her that he had been 
questioned by the SEC or that he had been questioned about her account. 
The jury acquitted Stewart of one specification charged in Count Three:   her 
statement that she and Bacanovic had agreed, at a time when ImClone was trading 
at $74 per share, that she would sell her shares when ImClone started trading at $60 
per share. 
Id. 
HASNAS 10/3/2005  1:33 PM 
612 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:579 
RICO, coupled with specific injunctions to the courts to construe the 
offenses broadly constituted an effective means for closing the loopholes in 
the fabric of white collar criminal law. 
This is certainly the way the mail and wire fraud statutes have been used.  
As described by former Chief Justice Warren Burger, the mail fraud statute 
has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as a first line of 
defense.  When a “new” fraud develops—as constantly happens—the 
mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis 
with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be 
developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.137 
 
Amplifying this sentiment, one federal prosecutor explained that 
the mail fraud statute, together with its lineal descendant, the wire fraud 
statute, has been characterized as the “first line of defense” against 
virtually every new area of fraud to develop in the United States in the 
past century.  Its applications, too numerous to catalog, cover not only 
the full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds, 
insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, but have extended even to such 
areas as blackmail, counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery.  In many 
of these and other areas, where legislatures have sometimes been slow to 
enact specific prohibitory legislation, the mail fraud statute has 
frequently represented the sole instrument of justice that could be 
wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners of deceit.138 
Thus, statutes such as the mail and wire fraud statutes are a manifestation 
of Congress’ quest for the ultimate weapon in the battle between con 
artists’ efforts to skate along the edge of the law, and the federal 
government’s effort to eliminate dishonest or deceptive business practices. 
The cost of creating such offenses that are broad enough to reach the full 
range of deceptive activity, however, is paid in terms of the failure to 
furnish the public with clear notice as to what constitutes criminal conduct 
and the lack of definite guidelines to govern law enforcement.  Although 
the courts have not (or perhaps merely not yet)139 declared the federal fraud 
                                                          
 137. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 138. Rakoff, supra note 73, at 772. 
 139. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting) (intimating that the issue may be ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court 
because  
the vagueness of the statute has induced court after court to undertake a rescue 
operation by fashioning something that (if enacted) would withstand a vagueness 
challenge. The felt need to do that attests to the constitutional weakness of section 
1346 as written. And the result of all these efforts–which has been to create 
different prohibitions and offenses in different circuits–confirms that the weakness 
is fatal.  Judicial invention cannot save a statute from unconstitutional vagueness; 
courts should not try to fill out a statute that makes it an offense to “intentionally 
cause harm to another,” or to “stray from the straight and narrow,” or to fail to 
render “honest services.”). 
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statutes to be unconstitutionally vague, many have recognized that they 
tread uncomfortably close to the constitutional border.  In a recent decision 
upholding the mail fraud statute against a vagueness challenge, the Second 
Circuit, after admitting that the statute’s meaning was not plain enough on 
its face to satisfy the constitutional standard, found the “well-settled 
meaning of scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of 
honest services”140 to be, 
a scheme or artifice to use the mails or wires to enable an officer or 
employee of a private entity (or a person in a relationship that gives rise 
to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to employers) 
purporting to act for and in the interests of his or her employer (or of the 
other person to whom the duty of loyalty is owed) secretly to act in his or 
her or the defendant’s own interests instead, accompanied by a material 
misrepresentation made or omission of information disclosed to the 
employer or other person.141 
But, as the dissent pointed out, this standard “in effect criminalizes all 
material acts of dishonesty by employees or by persons who owe analogous 
duties,”142 and would thus allow the criminal punishment 
of any of the following conduct:  a regulated company that employs a 
political spouse; an employee who violates an employee code of 
conduct; a lawyer who provides sky-box tickets to a client’s general 
counsel; a trustee who makes a self-dealing investment that pays off; or 
an officeholder who has made a decision in order to please a constituent 
or contributor, or to promote re-election, rather than for the public good 
(as some prosecutor may see the public good).143 
Because “[e]very salaried employee can be said to work for her own 
interest while purporting to act in the interests of the employer,”144 and 
because “the majority opinion effectively makes ‘dishonesty by an 
employee, standing alone, [ ] a crime,’”145 the “well-settled meaning” of the 
mail fraud statute appears to place very little limitation on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  And because the statute can apparently apply to 
virtually any form of dishonest or deceptive behavior, it gives the public 
very little notice of what the criminal law demands of them beyond a 
general injunction to render honest services. 
Secondly, the new regulatory offenses mitigated the prosecutor’s burden 
of proving mens rea.  Intent is typically the most difficult element for a 
prosecutor to establish.  This is especially true in the corporate environment 
                                                          
 140. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 141. Id. at 141-42. 
 142. Id. at 164 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 161. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
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with its diffuse responsibility, and is further magnified in cases dealing 
with complex regulatory requirements in which proving willful conduct 
requires the prosecutor to establish that the defendant knew that he or she 
was violating the law.146  Public welfare offenses eliminate this burden 
entirely.  Similarly, regulatory offenses that require only ordinary 
negligence reduce the burden to relative insignificance, since by permitting 
convictions to be based on the violation of an objective, reasonable person 
standard, these offenses eliminate the need for the prosecutor to introduce 
any evidence of what was actually in the defendant’s mind.  Dispensing 
with the need to prove intent is a great boon to federal prosecutors in that it 
converts the task of applying criminal sanctions to regulatory violations 
from one that is virtually impossible to one that is merely difficult.  But 
once again, this boon does not come without cost.  Because “the state of 
mind that accompanies one’s act is entirely within the individual’s 
control,”147 requiring the government to prove intent “substantially 
increase[s] the individual’s power to control his freedom from 
punishment.”148  Conversely, dispensing with the need to prove intent 
substantially decreases the extent to which individuals can exercise this 
power.  Thus, the cost of improving prosecutorial efficiency is the 
concomitant reduction in the assurance individuals can have that they will 
not inadvertently become enmeshed in the coils of the criminal law. 
Finally, the new secondary offenses provide prosecutors with a 
convenient route around the requirements of the presumption of innocence 
and proof beyond reasonable doubt.  As has already been noted, obtaining a 
conviction for one of the secondary offenses does not require establishing 
that the defendant is guilty of any underlying substantive criminal 
offense.149  This feature permits prosecutors to use the secondary offenses 
as vehicles to punish those whom they suspect, but cannot convict, of 
substantive criminal offenses.  Consider, for example, the use prosecutors 
can make of the money laundering statutes, which typically carry harsher 
sentences than most substantive white collar offenses and whose elements 
are easier to establish.  As two federal prosecutors themselves point out, 
[i]n addition to higher sentences in white collar cases, there are other 
advantages to federal prosecutors in pursuing money laundering charges 
against defendants, including:  . . . the ability to prosecute a wrongdoer 
when there is either insufficient evidence of the underlying criminal 
conduct or insufficient evidence connecting the wrongdoer to the 
                                                          
 146. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1991) (finding that the willful 
conduct requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) requires the government to prove the 
defendant knew his actions violated the statute). 
 147. Enker, supra note 18, at 668. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136. 
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underlying criminal conduct . . . .  [T]he money laundering statutes allow 
prosecutors to prosecute wrongdoers who very probably were involved 
in the underlying crime without enough evidence of this involvement to 
prosecute it directly.  Thus evidence of the underlying crime which may 
be insufficient to prove all the elements of the underlying crime may still 
be enough to show that a specified unlawful activity occurred—leading 
to a money laundering conviction even if the defendant is acquitted of 
the underlying crime.150 
Indeed, in United States v. Jackson,151 the defendant’s conviction on money 
laundering charges was upheld despite the fact that he was acquitted on the 
underlying substantive charge of drug trafficking. 
The false statements and obstruction of justice statutes can similarly be 
used to circumvent the need to prove every element of a substantive 
criminal offense beyond reasonable doubt.  It is entirely possible that 
certain employees of Arthur Andersen did engage in fraudulent activities in 
connection with the auditing of Enron’s books and, hence, that Arthur 
Andersen itself was guilty of a substantive offense.  Bringing such a case, 
however, would be an arduous and expensive task.  Prosecutors would have 
to invest the resources necessary to subpoena and review an extensive 
amount of documentation, interview potentially dozens of Andersen and 
Enron employees who might invoke their privilege against self-
incrimination, unravel a complex scheme of deception disguised to look 
like legally proper behavior, and establish either that at least one employee 
was acting intentionally in the scope of his or her employment, or that the 
partnership had sufficient collective knowledge to be aware that fraud was 
taking place.  Convicting Arthur Andersen of obstruction of justice, on the 
other hand, required the government to prove only that at least one person 
in the company attempted to persuade others to alter or destroy a document 
or documents that might be sought in connection with an investigation by a 
federal agency.  Similarly, it is considerably easier to obtain an obstruction 
of justice conviction against Frank Quattrone for forwarding a single e-mail 
than it is to develop the evidence necessary to prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that he was a knowing participant in a fraudulent scheme to charge 
higher than usual commissions to hedge funds in return for favorable 
allocations of initial public offerings.  Finally, in the Martha Stewart case, 
the government could not establish the elements of insider trading not for 
evidentiary reasons, but because one of the necessary elements of the 
                                                          
 150. B. FREDERICK WILLIAMS, JR. & FRANK D. WHITNEY, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING:   
CRIMES AND FORFEITURES 14-16 (1999).  Other advantages the authors mention include the 
ability to introduce potentially prejudicial evidence of wealth and “big spending” at trial and 
the ability to avoid the statute of limitations on the underlying offense by charging a 
defendant with a recent monetary transaction.  Id. at 15. 
 151. 983 F.2d 757, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1993); see supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
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offense, that Stewart be an insider or have misappropriated confidential 
information, was missing.  The prosecution was nevertheless able to 
circumvent the impossibility of meeting its burden of proof on the 
underlying substantive offense by charging and convicting Stewart of 
making false statements to federal investigators and obstructing an agency 
investigation. 
c. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
The advent of corporate criminal responsibility and the legislative 
creation of new white collar offenses considerably eased the burden that the 
liberal aspects of traditional criminal law imposed upon federal 
prosecutors.  Nevertheless, large corporations typically have extensive 
resources at their disposal with which to put on a defense, and they can use 
those resources to hire the most experienced and sophisticated members of 
the white collar criminal defense bar.  Thus, to the extent that they are 
willing to defend themselves against criminal charges, corporations still 
constitute a formidable adversary for federal prosecutors.  Anything that 
would make corporations less likely to mount such a defense would be a 
welcome addition to the prosecutors’ arsenal.  Just such an addition arrived 
in 1991 in the form of Chapter 8 of the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s Guidelines Manual, the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.152 
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines are designed to govern the 
sentencing of corporate entities convicted of violating federal law.  Because 
such entities cannot be imprisoned, the Guidelines consist of a schedule of 
fines to be levied against corporate violators that are determined on the 
basis of the offense committed and the organization’s corporate character 
as captured by a “culpability score.”  Although the Guidelines are complex, 
the aspects that are relevant to our present concerns are reasonably 
straightforward. 
When an organization is convicted of a federal offense, the fine it must 
pay is determined by multiplying a base fine by an amount derived from 
the organization’s culpability score.153  The base fine is the greatest of:  (1) 
the amount assigned to the offense that the organization has committed by 
an offense level fine table; (2) the pecuniary gain to the organization from 
the offense; or (3) the pecuniary loss from the offense knowingly caused by 
the organization.154  The offense level fine table assigns fines ranging from 
                                                          
 152. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1991).  The recent 
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines became effective on November 1, 2004.  See 
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C (2004) (amendment 673). 
 153. Id. § 8C2.7. 
 154. Id. § 8C2.4(a). 
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$5,000 to $72,500,000 to the various federal offenses in proportion to their 
severity.155  The resulting base fine “is intended to reflect the intrinsic 
seriousness of the underlying offense for which the organization bears 
vicarious liability.”156 
The organization’s culpability score consists in a number from zero to 
ten that is determined by assigning every organization a starting point of 
five which is then adjusted upward or downward on the basis of seven 
enumerated mitigating or aggravating factors.157  Three of these factors are 
of particular relevance to our present consideration.  The first is the 
aggravating factor for obstructing justice, which adds three points to the 
organization’s score if the organization obstructed, attempted to obstruct, or 
knowingly failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the obstruction of 
justice.158  The second is the mitigating factor for having an effective 
compliance program, which deducts three points if the offense occurred 
despite an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.159  
And the third is the mitigating factor for cooperation, which deducts five 
points 
[i]f the organization (A) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or 
government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after 
becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate 
governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and 
clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of 
responsibility for its criminal conduct . . . .160 
The culpability score that results from this calculation is designed to 
encapsulate “the organization’s institutional response to the offense, both 
before and after its commission.”161 
The organization’s culpability score is associated with minimum and 
maximum multipliers whose values range from .05 to 4.00.162  For 
example, a culpability score of 0 is assigned a minimum multiplier of .05 
and a maximum multiplier of .20, while a culpability score of 10 is 
assigned a minimum multiplier of 2.00 and a maximum multiplier of 
4.00.163  The base fine is then multiplied by both the minimum and 
maximum multiplier to determine the guideline fine range from which the 
                                                          
 155. Id. § 8C2.4(d). 
 156. JED S. RAKOFF ET AL., CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:   COMPLIANCE AND 
MITIGATION § 1.05[3] (1993). 
 157. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5. 
 158. Id. § 8C2.5(e). 
 159. Id. § 8C2.5(f). 
 160. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). 
 161. RAKOFF ET AL., supra note 156, § 2.06. 
 162. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.6. 
 163. Id. 
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judge must assign the organization’s fine.164 
A moment’s reflection reveals the overwhelming importance of the 
organization’s culpability score, which can reduce the organization’s fine 
by 95% or increase it by 400%.  This feature creates an almost irresistible 
incentive for organizations to achieve the lowest possible score.  As a 
result, organizations have the strongest possible reasons for seeking to 
avoid the three point increase for obstructing justice and to receive the 
three and five point reductions for having an effective compliance program 
and for cooperation.  Consider what achieving this goal requires. 
To avoid the enhancement to its culpability score for obstruction of 
justice, the organization must not only not obstruct or attempt to obstruct a 
federal investigation, it must also not knowingly fail to take reasonable 
steps to prevent such obstruction.  Therefore, to avoid the enhancement, the 
organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that none of its 
employees take actions that can constitute obstruction.  But as the 
Andersen and Quattrone cases demonstrate, obstruction of justice can 
consist of recommending that someone alter, destroy or conceal anything 
that may be relevant to a federal investigation.165  It may also consist of 
persuading someone not to speak to federal investigators,166 or to assert his 
or her Fifth Amendment rights.167  Thus, to avoid the enhancement for 
obstruction, organizations must make every reasonable effort both to 
preserve anything that can be used as evidence against it, and to ensure that 
no one is discouraged from providing such evidence to the government.  As 
a result, an organization that knowingly allowed its corporate counsel to 
advise employees that they are not required to make statements to federal 
investigators, or to suggest that they not speak to investigators without 
counsel present could, if convicted, receive a greater fine for doing so.  
This possibility can significantly raise the risk associated with electing to 
mount a vigorous defense to a criminal charge. 
To receive the reduction to its culpability score for having an effective 
compliance program, the organization must “exercise due diligence to 
prevent and detect criminal conduct.”168  Such due diligence requires not 
only that the organization undertake the criminal investigative function—
that it engage in “monitoring and auditing [the behavior of its employees] 
to detect criminal conduct” and maintain a system “whereby the 
                                                          
 164. Id. § 8C2.7. 
 165. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text. 
 166. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding 
that a jury could find an obstruction of justice where the defendant advised an employee not 
to speak with federal investigators). 
 167. See United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1974); Cole v. United States, 
329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Cortese, 586 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Pa. 1983). 
 168. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1(a)(1). 
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organization’s employees and agents may report or seek guidance 
regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of 
retribution”169—but to some extent the punitive function as well—that it 
impose “appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal 
conduct.”170  In essence, for an organization convicted of a federal offense 
to receive a reduced fine for having an effective compliance program, it 
must have a program designed to generate precisely the evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing on the part of its employees that the government can 
use to convict the organization itself.  Whether or not this is a reasonable 
indication of good corporate character as the Organizational Guidelines 
assumes, it is not the type of activity that is necessarily consistent with an 
organization’s efforts to vigorously defend itself  against criminal charges. 
Finally, to receive the all-important five point reduction for cooperation, 
the organization must voluntarily disclose its wrongful conduct in a timely 
manner, fully cooperate in the government’s investigation of that behavior, 
and clearly accept responsibility for its criminal conduct.171  For the 
disclosure to be timely, it must be made prior to an imminent threat of 
disclosure or government investigation, and within a reasonably prompt 
time after the organization becomes aware of the offense.172  This 
requirement essentially means as soon as possible because the disclosure is 
considered untimely once a government investigation commences, whether 
the organization is aware of that investigation or not.173  Full cooperation 
requires the organization to cooperate from the inception of the government 
investigation and to disclose “all pertinent information known by the 
organization,”174 which should include information that “is sufficient for 
law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense 
and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct.”175  Acceptance 
of responsibility essentially requires an organization to plead guilty to the 
offense charged without putting on a defense.  This is because although the 
[e]ntry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined 
with truthful admission of involvement in the offense and related 
conduct ordinarily will constitute significant evidence of affirmative 
acceptance of responsibility under subsection (g), . . . [t]his adjustment is 
not intended to apply to an organization that puts the government to its 
burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of 
                                                          
 169. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A), (C). 
 170. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6). 
 171. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 924 F.2d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a company’s disclosure of fraud was untimely because the disclosure was 
made on the night before the indictment was announced). 
 174. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12. 
 175. Id. 
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guilt . . . .176 
Needless to say, this provision creates a strong disincentive for an 
organization to mount a defense to federal charges.  Indeed, “under the 
Guidelines, the price a defendant pays for exercising its constitutional right 
to trial is the preclusion of the possibility of having its culpability score 
reduced . . . under Section 8C2.5(g).”177 
Significantly, the determination of whether an organization has 
cooperated sufficiently to be eligible for the five point reduction in its 
culpability score rests with the prosecutors.  Because courts will not award 
the reduction without a recommendation from the prosecutor, cooperation 
is, for all intents and purposes, what prosecutors say it is.178  And, pursuant 
to a memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson 
containing the DOJ’s policy on cooperation (hereinafter the Thompson 
Memorandum),179 prosecutors frequently say that it is a corporation’s 
willingness to waive attorney-client privilege, to refrain from paying its 
employees’ legal fees, and to refuse to enter into joint defense agreements 
with its employees.180 
With regard to the waiver of attorney-client privilege, the Thompson 
Memorandum states that: 
                                                          
 176. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 13. 
 177. RAKOFF ET AL., supra note 156, § 4.03[1]. 
 178. See American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 
307, 320 (2003); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of A Brave New 
World:   The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
147, 154-55 (2000). 
 179. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Department Components, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guide lines.htm.  The Thompson Memorandum is 
a slightly revised version of the 1999 memorandum issued by Eric Holder to the same 
effect.  See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and All United States Attorneys, Federal 
Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999) (summarizing factors prosecutors should take 
into account “in assessing the adequacy of a corporation’s cooperation”), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html. The Thompson 
Memorandum states the Department of Justice’s policy regarding the decision to charge an 
organization with an offense, not its policy regarding the decision to recommend the 
cooperation reduction to an organization’s culpability score.  Thompson Memorandum, 
supra, § II(A). In practice, however, no distinction is made and the same policy is applied to 
both decisions.  Indeed, with regard to the waiver of attorney-client privilege, the revisions 
to the Guidelines explicitly recognize the Department of Justice policy by stating that 
“[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to 
a reduction in culpability score under subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (g) unless such 
waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent 
information known to the organization.”  U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (emphasis 
added). 
 180. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B); see also Zornow & Krakaur, 
supra note 178, at 154-56 (arguing that federal prosecutors’ zealous application of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have eviscerated the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine). 
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[o]ne factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a 
corporation’s cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, 
if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work product 
protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and with 
respect to communications between specific officers, directors and 
employees and counsel. Such waivers permit the government to obtain 
statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to 
negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements . . . . 
[P]rosecutors should consider the willingness of a corporation to waive 
such protection when necessary to provide timely and complete 
information as one factor in evaluating the corporation’s cooperation.181 
Pursuant to this policy, federal prosecutors now routinely require 
corporations to waive attorney-client and work product privileges at the 
outset of an investigation in order to be regarded as fully cooperating.182  
As the Thompson Memorandum makes clear in stating that, “[s]uch 
waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, 
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or 
                                                          
 181. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B). 
 182. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 178, at 154 (stating that “[f]ederal 
prosecutors . . . now often insist, even at the outset of an investigation, that corporations turn 
over privileged communications, attorney work product, and incriminating statements from 
corporate employees as a condition of favorable treatment in the exercise of the prosecutor’s 
considerable discretion.”); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, Some Thoughts on Proposed 
Revisions to the Organizational Guidelines, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 495-96 (2004) 
(“Defense lawyers cite what they report to be regular governmental demands that 
corporations waive otherwise applicable privileges if they wish to avoid indictment or gain 
credit at sentencing for cooperating with the government as the principal impetus for the 
‘death’ of corporate privileges. The defense bar clearly believes that federal prosecutors are, 
with increasing regularity, demanding that corporations waive the attorney-client privilege 
and work product protection as a condition of securing leniency in charging or at 
sentencing. According to defense practitioners, ‘[w]aiver of the privilege is now a routine 
part of discussing a corporate resolution’ of a criminal investigation.”). 
Indeed, Professor O’Sullivan points out: 
The Arthur Andersen case may present a cautionary tale. Some argue that “[u]nder 
most objective standards, [Arthur Andersen, LLP] did everything in its power to 
avoid a prosecution that it knew would be a ‘death penalty’ for the firm,” except 
agree to waive the attorney-client privilege. Thus, Andersen reportedly notified the 
Justice Department and SEC immediately upon learning of the document 
destruction in its Houston office.  Andersen was also apparently willing to enter 
into a deferred prosecution agreement, “in essence a guilty plea, under which the 
government could have appointed a special monitor to oversee compliance with its 
new document retention policy and with other reforms to be approved by the DOJ.”  
Finally, Andersen also agreed to expel the individuals responsible for the document 
destruction and did, of course, fire the head of Andersen’s auditing team for Enron 
(and the government’s cooperating witness in Andersen’s criminal trial), David 
Duncan. Finally, Andersen “reportedly offered to pay as much as $750 million to 
Enron shareholders who had sued Andersen for its role in auditing Enron’s books.” 
Despite these efforts, the Department of Justice decided to seek an indictment and 
ultimately secured a conviction of the partnership. 
Id. at 496 n.30 (citing Laurence A. Urgenson et al., Attorney-Client Privilege:   Surviving 
Corporate Fraud Scandal, 9 BUS. CRIMES BULL. 1, 6 (2002)). 
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immunity agreements,”183 “there is no pretense that the values underlying 
these privileges are to be sacrificed for any reason other than to make the 
prosecution’s job easier.”184  Accordingly, “[t]he Justice Department does 
not merely seek disclosure of contemporaneous legal advice concerning the 
underlying conduct at issue in an investigation.  It also asks for the ‘factual 
internal investigation,’ presumably because access to such attorney work 
product is an easy way to obtain evidence that the government formerly 
had to generate on its own.”185  Because “[t]he prosecutor can influence the 
severity of the sentence . . . by recommending the deduction of cooperation 
points from the Guidelines calculation, . . . federal prosecutors can demand 
that companies disclose privileged information at the outset of an 
investigation, and the client is often left with no rational choice but to 
accede.”186 
With regard to the payment of employees’ attorney’s fees and entering 
into joint defense agreements with employees, the Thompson 
Memorandum states that 
[a]nother factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the 
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.  
Thus, while cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a 
corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and agents, 
either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the 
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing 
information to the employees about the government’s investigation 
pursuant to a joint defense agreement, may be considered by the 
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s 
cooperation.187 
Thus, even an organization that waives attorney-client privilege may still 
be denied the reduction for cooperating if it advances the legal fees of an 
employee the government regards as guilty,188 fails to fire such an 
employee, or agrees to cooperate with such an employee in preparing his or 
her defense.  “Prosecutors have seized upon the new guidelines language 
and the Thompson Memorandum’s discussion of privilege waiver and now 
                                                          
 183. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B). 
 184. American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 178, at 319. 
 185. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 178, at 178. 
 186. Id. at 154; see also E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. et al., Cooperation with Government is 
a Growing Trend, NAT’L L.J., July 19, 2004, at S2 (suggesting that the increase in 
investigation and prosecution of corporate crime evinces a trend in which cooperation “with 
the government—not by choice—is often the only road to survival for both corporations and 
their executives.”). 
 187. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B). 
 188. Interestingly, because the laws of several states require organizations to pay the 
legal fees of employees under investigation, the Thompson Memorandum includes a 
footnote indicating that payment of legal fees in such cases cannot be regarded as a failure 
to cooperate.  See id. § 4 n.4. 
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regularly take the position that the only way for a company to avoid 
indictment is to cooperate, which requires waiving the privilege and not 
assisting or protecting employees who are targets.”189  The effect of these 
incentives is illustrated by the case of the accounting firm of KPMG, which 
is under investigation for tax shelters that it sold to its clients.190  KPMG 
is cooperating with the government and refusing to assist partners and 
employees whom the government deems as uncooperative.  KPMG 
refused to pay the legal fees of its partners and employees unless they 
agreed to cooperate with the prosecutors, refused to enter joint defense 
agreements with its partners, agreed to tell prosecutors which documents 
the employees and partners are requesting, and fired or threatened to fire 
those employees whom the government indicates are not cooperating.191 
As considerations such as these make apparent, the Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines provide prosecutors with a powerful tool for 
circumventing the inherent liberalism of the criminal law.  To begin with, 
the Guidelines constitute an extraordinarily effective means of reducing the 
strain on the prosecutorial resources that result from having to overcome 
the presumption of innocence.  There is no need to bear the expense 
required to establish every element of an offense beyond reasonable doubt 
if the defendant pleads guilty.  By increasing the potential cost of taking a 
case to trial, the Guidelines discourage organizations from putting on a 
defense at all.  The increased level of fines that an organization can receive 
by going to trial and losing rather than pleading guilty and cooperating can 
be so massive (the difference between multiplying the base fine by .05 and 
4) that it will  usually be economically irrational for the organization to 
maintain its innocence.  Indeed, the Guidelines can have such a profound 
effect on the organization’s bottom line that John Coffee of the Columbia 
Law School has declared that “[f]or a general counsel to ignore these 
guidelines is professional malpractice.”192  Thus, to the extent that the 
Guidelines effectively incentivize organizations to plead guilty, federal 
prosecutors are relieved of the burden of overcoming the presumption of 
innocence. 
But the Guidelines do much more than merely discourage organizations 
from mounting a defense to charges brought against it as a corporate entity.  
To a great extent, they turn organizations into an auxiliary in the 
prosecution of its employees as individuals.  The stick of the increase in 
culpability score for obstruction of justice and the carrots of the reductions 
for compliance programs and cooperation essentially present organizations 
                                                          
 189. Barcella, Jr. et al., supra note 186, at S2 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Michele Galen, Keeping the Long Arm of the Law at Arm’s Length, BUS. WK., Apr. 
22, 1991, at 104. 
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with a tripartite injunction to:  (1) do nothing that would help its employees 
defend themselves against criminal charges or discourage them from 
cooperating with the government; (2) perform a thorough criminal 
investigation of its employees; and (3) turn the results of this investigation 
over to the government.  Unsurprisingly, given the size of the incentives 
involved, business organizations frequently comply with this injunction. 
More so than ever before, corporations faced with significant criminal 
investigations are cooperating with the government by collecting and 
analyzing documents relating to the suspected criminal activity, 
interviewing employees, conducting costly and time-consuming internal 
investigations and forensic audits, and turning over the results of this 
work to the government. . . .  In a clear sign that a cooperating company 
becomes an arm of the government, a few months ago federal 
prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York charged corporate 
executives of Computer Associates International Inc. with obstruction of 
justice for false statements they made to the company’s outside counsel 
during an internal investigation; they pleaded guilty.193 
Thus, the Guidelines allow prosecutors to pass the costs of criminal 
investigations along to private businesses.  In effect, they convert part of 
the expense of establishing the guilt of individual white collar criminal 
defendants from a charge on the federal budget into a cost of doing 
business in the United States.  This is a particularly effective way of 
avoiding the presumption of innocence’s injunction that “the government 
not only . . . establish its case, but [do] so by its own resources.”194 
It should not be surprising that the Organizational Guidelines function in 
this way.  As previously discussed, regardless of the size of the DOJ’s 
budget, it would be impossible for the Department to  effectively enforce 
the laws against white collar crime if it was required to prove every offense 
beyond reasonable doubt with its own resources.195  The number of 
businesses in the United States is simply too great and the opportunities for 
dishonest conduct and regulatory violation too vast for any centralized 
agency to be able to effectively police the business environment.  The 
nature of the conduct that is criminalized by the white collar offenses 
implies that effective enforcement requires that businesses be made to 
police themselves.  The presumption of innocence of the traditional 
criminal law is thus incompatible with the effective enforcement of white 
collar criminal law.  Hence, the internal logic of white collar criminal law 
itself leads to the incentives that are built into the Guidelines.  The 
Guidelines contain the incentives they do because one of their essential 
                                                          
 193. Barcella, Jr., et al., supra note 186, at S2. 
 194. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 26. 
 195. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
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functions is to conscript businesses into the war on white collar crime.196 
A second important effect of the Organizational Guidelines is that they 
enable prosecutors to circumvent the organization’s attorney-client 
privilege.  As discussed previously, organizations have no Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.197  Therefore, the 
organization’s attorney-client privilege is the only impediment to a 
prosecutor obtaining all potentially incriminating evidence in the 
possession of a corporate defendant.  By empowering prosecutors to deny 
organizations the five point reduction in their culpability score for 
cooperation unless they waive attorney-client privilege,198 the Guidelines 
effectively emasculate the privilege by making it too costly to assert.  This 
gives prosecutors open access to all corporate records for the purpose of 
building a case against both the organization and its employees. 
The advantage of this access for prosecutors is not so much that it 
provides them with otherwise unobtainable information, but that it greatly 
reduces the cost of developing obtainable information on their own.  The 
attorney-client privilege protects only communications made to and by the 
organization’s counsel in anticipation of litigation.199  Hence, it does not 
allow an organization to prevent the prosecution from obtaining any factual 
evidence of criminal activity.  As the Supreme Court has pointed out, 
“[a]pplication of the attorney-client privilege to communications . . . puts 
the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never 
taken place.  The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it 
does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who 
communicated with the attorney.”200  Thus, “[t]he client cannot be 
compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the 
attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his 
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his 
                                                          
 196. See Winthrop Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines’ “Carrot and Stick” 
Philosophy, and Their Focus on “Effective” Compliance, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME:   LAW 
AND PRACTICE 782, 785 (Jerold H. Israel et al. eds., 1st ed. 1996) (articulating that the 
Guidelines’ third objective is “to create incentives for companies to take crime controlling 
actions.”). 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. 
 198. This policy, which was implicit prior to November 1, 2004, is now explicitly 
recognized by the Guidelines.  See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (providing that 
“[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to 
a reduction in culpability score . . . unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide 
timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 178, at 155-56 (contending that 
the ambiguous word “necessary” used in the Thompson Memorandum, and now enshrined 
in the Sentencing Guidelines, enables federal prosecutors to obtain a corporation’s waiver of 
attorney-client privilege). 
 199. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). 
 200. Id. 
HASNAS 10/3/2005  1:33 PM 
626 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:579 
communication to his attorney.”201  Accordingly, prosecutors are free to 
question any and all corporate employees in an attempt to develop evidence 
of criminal activity themselves.  This, however, can be an expensive 
undertaking, both in man-hours and because employees tend to be less 
forthcoming with police agents than they are with corporate counsel.  
Further, unlike organizations, individuals do possess a Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, which they may assert in order to refrain 
from supplying information to the government.  Thus, getting access to the 
internal investigations performed by corporate counsel allows prosecutors 
both to avoid the expense of performing the investigation themselves and to 
obtain information that would otherwise be barred by individuals’ Fifth 
Amendment rights.  Hence, by inducing organizations to waive their 
attorney-client privileges, the Guidelines allow prosecutors to kill two 
liberal birds with one stone; circumventing not only the corporate common 
law privilege, but the individual constitutional one as well. 
Finally, the Organizational Guidelines help prosecutors avoid having to 
overcome the presumption of innocence in its cases against individuals as 
well.  By requiring organizations not only to refrain from helping their 
employees prepare a defense, but to affirmatively aid the government in 
making its case against them in order to get the culpability score reduction 
for cooperation, the Guidelines greatly increase both the cost and the risk 
individual employees face in electing to go to trial.  Given that white collar 
criminal defense costs can frequently run in the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars,202 the refusal to advance employees’ legal fees can bring intense 
pressure on individual employees to plead guilty.  This financial pressure is 
exacerbated by the fact that by defending themselves, the employees are 
refusing to cooperate with the government, and thus, under the Thompson 
Memorandum, the organization must fire them  in order to be assured that 
it will be regarded as cooperating.203  Adding to this pressure is the 
increased risk of conviction that arises from the organization not only 
turning over all incriminating evidence to the government, but also 
informing the government of any request for documents or information that 
the employees may make in preparing their defense.  Under these 
circumstances, a significant number of individual targets of federal 
investigations will elect to forgo their day in court and plead guilty, which, 
of course, entirely relieves prosecutors of the burden of establishing guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt.204 
                                                          
 201. Id. at 396 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 
(E.D. Pa. 1962)). 
 202. See Laurie P. Cohen, Prosecutor’s Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against 
Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1. 
 203. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI.B. 
 204. Since this Article was written, the United States Supreme Court decided United 
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II. FIVE ETHICAL DILEMMAS 
The traditional criminal law may be an adequate mechanism for 
combating violent crime or actions that directly harm or violate the rights 
of others.  Its inherent liberal features, however, make it a poor tool for 
extending the kind of social control necessary to suppress general dishonest 
or deceptive behavior and the violation of malum prohibitum regulations.  
By nevertheless criminalizing such conduct, the federal government created 
a body of law that it could not effectively enforce within the confines of the 
traditional criminal law.  Hence, the internal logic of the federal campaign 
against white collar crime required significant alterations to both the 
substance and procedures of the criminal law that would eliminate, or 
permit the circumvention of, several of its liberal safeguards.  These 
alterations arrived via the recognition of the concept of corporate criminal 
responsibility, the creation of broad new substantive, regulatory, and 
secondary offenses, and the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.  The principal effect of the first and third of these innovations 
was to effectively deputize America’s business organizations as auxiliary 
law enforcement agents, while the principal effect of the second was to 
vastly expand the range of activities within the ambit of the criminal 
sanction. 
These alterations to the workings of the criminal law significantly 
changed the environment within which corporate officers make managerial 
decisions.  Most significantly, they changed the legal rewards and 
punishments associated with the way organizations treat their employees.  
If ethics were coextensive with obedience to law, this would not constitute 
a problem.  Acting in accordance with the law and its incentives would be 
equivalent to acting ethically, and organizations need have no qualms about 
treating their employees in whatever way the law demanded.  But, ethics is 
not coextensive with legality, and responding to legal incentives does not 
                                                          
States v. Booker, and United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), holding the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional and rendering them merely advisory.  In the author’s 
opinion, these decisions undermine none of the points raised in this Article.  The Guidelines 
still serve as the basic framework for determining an organization’s fine.  Although judges 
are now free to depart from the Guideline sentencing range when circumstances warrant, 
this will not affect the ordinary case.  Judges will still calculate and be guided by an 
organization’s culpability score, which means the incentives created by the enhancement for 
obstruction of justice and the reductions for having an effective compliance program and for 
cooperation will still be in effect.  Further, the decisions have no effect at all on the 
Thompson Memorandum, which means the Guidelines’ incentives for cooperation will still 
be operative as a means of avoiding indictment, something that is more important to 
organizations than merely reducing their fines upon conviction.  Finally, organizations will 
be aware that should they be indicted, their ability to receive the five point culpability score 
reduction for cooperation still depends on their receiving a recommendation to that effect 
from the prosecutor, whose standards for cooperation are likewise governed by the 
Thompson Memorandum. 
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guarantee that an organization is acting ethically, as the Jim Crow 
legislation that mandated racial segregation makes abundantly clear.  
Therefore, to the extent that white collar criminal law induces organizations 
to treat their employees improperly or violate any other ethical obligation, 
it can create difficult and poignant ethical dilemmas for the organizations’ 
managers. 
There is currently a wide range of opinions regarding the nature and 
extent of business persons’ ethical obligations.  On one end of the 
ideological spectrum is the so-called stockholder theory,205 which views 
corporate officers as agents of the organization’s owners (the stockholders) 
who have a fiduciary obligation to pursue their principals’ interests, usually 
characterized as the maximization of profits, in preference to those of all 
other parties.  At the other end of the spectrum, are the stakeholder and 
social contract theories, which view corporate officers as having ethical 
obligations to not merely the organization’s owners, but, in the case of the 
stakeholder theory, to all parties whose interests are significantly affected 
by the organization’s activities, such as employees, customers, suppliers, 
and the local community;206 or, in the case of the social contract theory, to 
society as a whole.207  But all of these theories share two common 
features—they recognize that business people retain all the ordinary ethical 
obligations that they possess as human beings208 and they instruct business 
people to fulfill their ethical obligations within the law.  Thus, to the extent 
the law requires business people to act in ways that would violate either 
their personal ethical obligations or those additional obligations that arise 
from their status as corporate officers, a business person’s legal and ethical 
obligations are in conflict.  The question then becomes which obligation 
should predominate.  Currently, this question arises in at least five areas of 
managerial decision-making—those concerning the organization’s efforts 
to:  (1) realize organizational justice; (2) properly respect employees’ 
                                                          
 205. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also John 
Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics:   A Guide for the Perplexed, 8 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 19, 21-25 (1998). 
 206. William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern 
Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 75 (Tom L. 
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed., 1993); see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 
25-28. 
 207. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of 
Business Ethics:  Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994); 
see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 29-30. 
 208. In other words, becoming a business person may subject individuals to the 
additional ethical obligations specified by the various theories of business ethics, but it does 
not relieve them of any of the obligations they possess as human beings. Becoming the 
agent of an organization’s owners or stakeholders, or of society at large, does not empower 
one to take actions that would be unethical if they were undertaken on one’s own behalf.  
Dennis P. Quinn & Thomas M. Jones, An Agent Morality View of Business Policy, 20 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 22, 37-38 (1995). 
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privacy; (3) maintain needed confidentiality; (4) engender trust within the 
organization; and (5) engage in ethical self-assessment. 
A. Organizational Justice 
Questions of justice are not limited to the realm of the law.  Although 
justice may be the cardinal virtue of a legal system, legal justice is not all 
of justice.  Justice is the general virtue that requires the fair treatment of 
individuals in all interpersonal relationships.209  Because business 
organizations consist of networks of interpersonal relationships, questions 
of justice necessarily arise in the context of organizations as well.  
Organizations have an ethical obligation to treat their employees justly.  
But precisely what does this obligation entail? 
This question may be asked from both a deontological and 
consequentialist perspective.  From a deontological perspective, the 
question would be whether justice demands that organizations treat their 
employees in certain ways as a matter of principle, regardless of the 
consequences.  In the context of this article, this amounts to the question of 
what principles govern the treatment of employees who are suspected of 
criminal wrongdoing by federal authorities.  At least three principles are 
implicated—reciprocity, the presumption of innocence, and due process. 
Reciprocity refers to the obligation to honor one’s commitment to a 
mutually beneficial relationship when the other party has met his or her 
commitment to you.  Business organizations expect their employees to 
exhibit loyalty to the organization and to advance the organization’s 
interests in preference to those of competitors or outside groups.210  The 
principle of reciprocity requires that, to the extent that employees act in 
accordance with this duty of loyalty, the organization exhibit a similar 
loyalty to its employees’ by  giving their interests preference over those of 
outside parties.211  The presumption of innocence refers to the more general 
version of the ethical principle that operates within the criminal law.  
Because of employees’ limited resources and dependence on the employer, 
and because it is so difficult to prove a negative, justice requires that 
organizations not assume that their employees have behaved improperly in 
the absence of adequate evidence.  The presumption of innocence may also 
                                                          
 209. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5 (D. A. Rees ed., Oxford Univ. Press 
1951). 
 210. See NORMAN BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS 141 (1982); Sissela Bok, Whistleblowing 
and Professional Responsibilities, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 306 (Tom L. 
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed. 1993). 
 211. See Patricia H. Werhane, Employee and Employer Rights in an Institutional 
Context, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 270-71 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. 
Bowie eds., 3d ed. 1988) (explaining that in exchange for working for, being fair to, and 
respecting their employers, employees should expect fair pay, privacy, and due process in 
the workplace). 
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be seen as derivative of the principle of reciprocity in the sense that it 
constitutes a specific instance of the loyalty that an organization owes to its 
employees in return for its employees’ loyalty to the organization.  Finally, 
due process refers to the requirement that one be judged by fair processes, 
which include an opportunity to speak in one’s own defense.  Like the 
presumption of innocence, due process may be seen as either a general 
requirement of justice or as an obligation derived from the principle of 
reciprocity. 
If justice truly demands that organizations act in accordance with the 
principles of reciprocity, the presumption of innocence, and due process, 
then a business manager’s legal and ethical obligations will come into 
conflict.  We have seen that the concept of corporate criminal responsibility 
and the requirements of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines place the 
organization and its employees in an adversarial relationship.  Because the 
organization is strictly liable for the actions that its employees perform 
within the scope of their employment, the only way for the organization to 
reduce its exposure to financial penalties is to cooperate with the 
government in its investigation of the organization’s employees.  But as 
previously noted, under the Guidelines, cooperation requires the 
organization to essentially become part of the prosecutorial team.212  And 
this, in turn, requires the organization to violate all three of the principles of 
organizational justice. 
With regard to the question of whether an organization’s employees 
engaged in criminal wrongdoing, there are only three epistemological 
possibilities—the organization may know that the employee is guilty, it 
may know that the employee is innocent, or it may not know whether the 
employee is guilty or innocent.  If the organization knows that the 
employee is guilty, there may be no problem.  In such a case, cooperating 
with the prosecution would breach neither the principle of reciprocity nor 
the presumption of innocence because, by breaking the law, the employee 
breached his or her duty of loyalty to the organization and hence is entitled 
to none in return, and because the organization has, by hypothesis, 
adequate evidence of guilt.  On the other hand, even in this case, there may 
be a due process problem because even the guilty are entitled to a fair 
hearing before being subject to sanction, and the Guidelines’ timeliness 
requirement for cooperation can require an organization to take action 
against an employee without delay.213 
If the organization knows the employee is innocent, however, the 
                                                          
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 171-194. 
 213. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(g)(1) (noting that, for a corporation to meet its 
timeliness requirement, it must report or take action against an employee before a 
government investigation begins); supra text accompanying notes 172-173 (same). 
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Guidelines place it in an impossible situation.  To gain the five point 
reduction in its culpability score for cooperation, the organization must 
help the government try to convict an innocent person.  The organization 
must breach reciprocity by eschewing aid to a loyal employee, act in 
contravention of the presumption of innocence by taking action against the 
employee despite the lack of evidence of wrongdoing, and violate due 
process by either denying the employee a fair hearing or acting in 
derogation of what such a hearing would establish.  Yet, if the 
organization’s managers do not act in this way, they expose the 
organization to criminal indictment and potentially massive financial 
penalties. 
The same holds true in those cases in which the organization does not 
know whether the employee is guilty or innocent; a situation in which 
organizations will frequently find themselves due to the indistinct border 
between lawful and criminal conduct associated with broadly defined 
crimes such as the federal fraud offenses.214  This  is precisely the situation 
in which the principles of organizational justice are most pertinent because 
they instruct organizations to give employees the benefit of the doubt.  In 
this situation, reciprocity, the presumption of innocence, and due process 
may require organizations to provide their employees with legal advice, 
help them to defray the cost of defending themselves, and retain them in 
their positions until their guilt or innocence is established.  Yet, this is 
precisely the type of behavior that the Guidelines discourage. 
A similar result obtains if one views questions of justice from a 
consequentialist perspective.  Over the past several decades, a great deal of 
academic and managerial attention has been devoted to the internal 
dynamics of organizations.215  Those engaged in such “organizational 
behavior” research study how individuals respond to incentives in 
organizations in an effort to build better interpersonal relationships that 
allow organizations to achieve their objectives more effectively.  One 
aspect of this study concerns how the fairness with which employees are 
treated and perceive themselves as being treated affects both the 
employees’ and organization’s performance.  This research demonstrates 
that organizations that are committed to providing procedural justice216 to 
                                                          
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 83-94.   
 215. See, e.g., Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium:   A Meta-Analytical 
Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 426 
(2000). 
 216. Organizational justice researchers define procedural justice in terms of six criteria: 
[T]o be perceived as fair, [p]rocedures should (a) be applied consistently across 
people and across time, (b) be free from bias (e.g., ensuring that a third party has no 
vested interest in a particular settlement), (c) ensure that accurate information is 
collected and used in making decisions, (d) have some mechanism to correct 
flawed or inaccurate decisions, (e) conform to personal or prevailing standards of 
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their employees have employees who are more satisfied with their jobs and 
exhibit higher levels of commitment to the organization’s goals.217  That is, 
organizations whose employees view themselves as being treated fairly 
tend to perform better than those whose employees do not.218  Thus, 
regardless of whether one adheres to the stakeholder or social contract 
theories that posit an independent obligation to employees,219 or the 
stockholder theory that instructs managers to create the most efficient 
organization,220 managers have, all other things being equal, an ethical 
obligation to ensure the just treatment of an organization’s employees.  
However, since the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines took effect, all 
other things are not equal.  Now, maintaining corporate policies of 
procedural justice with regard to employees under federal investigation can 
subject the organization to indictment or a greatly increased fine.  Under 
these circumstances, it is no longer clear that preserving organizational 
justice is in the organization’s best interest. 
Thus, managers are faced with conflicting legal and ethical obligations 
that require them to make extremely difficult decisions.  If the law demands 
cooperation, does that make it ethical to help the government prosecute 
those who are or might be innocent or to deny organizational due process to 
these employees?  On the other hand, is it ethical to put the stockholder’s 
money and the well-being of the organization’s other stakeholders at risk 
merely to give a fair hearing to those who may well have broken the law 
and put the organization in jeopardy?  Think back to the first of the 
vignettes with which I began this article.  If you were the CEO of MTS and 
sincerely believed Tudor to be innocent of the offenses with which she is 
charged, would you act on this belief?  Should you?  Does MTS owe any 
loyalty to Tudor?  If so, how much?  Enough to put the company at risk by 
standing by her until her guilt is established?  The combination of corporate 
criminal responsibility, which holds organizations strictly liable for the 
offenses of its employees, and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 
which effectively punishes organizations for putting on a (losing) defense, 
                                                          
ethics or morality, and (f) ensure that the opinions of various groups affected by the 
decision have been taken into account. 
Id. at 426. 
 217. Id. at 434. 
 218. See Marshall Sashkin & Richard L. Williams, Does Fairness Make a Difference?, 
19 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 56, 57 (1990). 
 219. See Evan & Freeman, supra note 206, at 97 (noting that under the stakeholder 
theory, managers owe a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders, including suppliers, customers, 
employees, and community members); see also THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND 
MORALITY 57 (1982) (revealing that social contract theorists believe that organizations’ 
underlying functions are to promote social welfare to consumers and employees). 
 220. See Hasnas, supra note 205, at 22 (stating that the stockholder theory poses the 
view that managers have the sole duty of increasing profits by an legal, non-fraudulent 
means possible). 
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drives a financial wedge between the interests of the organization and its 
employees.  Thus, the contemporary law of white collar crime literally 
confronts corporate managers with an age-old ethical dilemma:  what price  
loyalty? 
B. Privacy 
Like justice, privacy has both a legal and an ethical dimension.  The 
constitutional right to privacy protects individuals against state and federal 
government interference with certain intimate decisions and conduct, and 
the common law right to privacy protects them against certain invasions of 
their private space and unwanted revelations of private facts by their fellow 
citizens.  But these legal protections do not necessarily exhaust the amount 
of privacy that individuals are morally entitled to enjoy.  The moral right to 
privacy refers to a wider realm of protection against intrusion into one’s 
personal affairs, the public dissemination of one’s secrets, and the type of 
constant supervision and monitoring associated with Orwell’s 1984.221  
Thus, ethically speaking, “[t]he concept of privacy limits the amount and 
effectiveness of social control over an individual. . . .  Privacy protects the 
individual by limiting scrutiny by others and the control some of them have 
over our lives.”222 
Employees of private business organizations have little legal protection 
against their employer’s invasion of their privacy in the workplace.223  
Because constitutional provisions do not apply to private actions, 
employers legally can, and sometimes do, subject their employees to 
intense monitoring.224  Ethical requirements to respect individuals’ privacy 
                                                          
 221. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). 
 222. Rogene Buchholz, Privacy, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF 
BUSINESS ETHICS 504 (Patricia H. Werhane & R. Edward Freeman eds., 1997). 
 223. Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity between Public and Private 
Sector Employee Privacy Protections:  A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private 
Sector Workers, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 51, 54 (2001).  
 224. For example, 
Drug and alcohol testing through hair follicles reveals data relating to the subject’s 
personal life for a period of up to six months for a three-inch section of hair.  
Employee monitoring or surveillance systems infiltrate the worker’s daily 
environment, yielding information as banal as how many times the individual takes 
bathroom breaks during the work day.  In one instance, telephone calls received by 
airline reservation agents were electronically monitored on a second-by-second 
basis; agents were allowed only eleven seconds between each call and twelve 
minutes of break time each day.  In fact, it is estimated that American employers 
monitor more than 750 calls every minute. 
Surveillance permeates other areas of the work place, as well.  Employers monitor 
the key-strokes of two-thirds of all computer operators, and complaints of employer 
e-mail intrusions are increasing.  A recent MacWorld survey found that twenty-two 
percent of large businesses in a variety of industries “engaged in searches of 
employee computer files, voice mail, electronic mail, or other networking 
communications,” and fewer than one-third of these companies warn the workers 
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do apply to the workplace, however, and limit the extent to which business 
organizations may legitimately spy on their employees.  From the 
stakeholder and social contract perspectives, employees’ rights to privacy 
in the workplace flow either from the organization’s obligation to respect 
the dignity of their stakeholder groups, which include employees,225 or 
from an implicit term in the social contract between society and business 
organizations.226  Further, even from the stockholder perspective, 
organizations have an ethical obligation to respect employees’ privacy 
because, like the maintenance of organizational justice, doing so produces a 
workforce that performs better and is more committed to the organization’s 
success.227 
By entering into the employment relationship, employees waive their 
right to privacy to a certain degree.  Employers are entitled to job-related 
information about their employees—information that is necessary to ensure 
that employees can adequately perform their jobs in an appropriate 
manner.228  Further, employers are entitled to monitor their employees’ 
behavior to the extent necessary to ensure that they do so perform.229  But 
employers are not ethically entitled to pry into employees’ personal lives or 
to monitor employees’ behavior for other purposes, even though acquiring 
such information or engaging in such action may improve overall corporate 
performance.  The law of white collar crime, however, virtually requires 
business organizations to exceed these ethical constraints. 
Because the standard for corporate criminal responsibility makes 
organizations strictly liable for the offenses of their employees, 
organizations can avoid criminal liability only by preventing their 
employees from violating the law.  This pressure is reinforced by the 
                                                          
that such surveillance is taking place. 
Id. at 52-53. 
 225. See Evan & Freeman, supra note 206, at 101.  
 226. See Laura P. Hartman, Technology and Ethics:   Privacy in the Workplace, 106 
BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 17 (2001).  In contemporary social contract terminology, the right to 
privacy constitutes a “hypernorm”—a principle “so fundamental to human existence that [it] 
serve[s] as a guide in evaluating lower level moral norms,” Donaldson & Dunfee, supra 
note 207, at 265—that all business organizations are required to respect. 
 227. See BOWIE, supra note 210, at 90-91; see also Pincus & Trotter, supra note 223, at 
56. 
 228. Pincus & Trotter, supra note 223, at 88. 
 229. See George Brenkert, Privacy, Polygraphs, and Work, in BUSINESS ETHICS:   
READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY 294, 295 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer 
Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990) (noting that “the information to which the employer . . . is 
entitled . . . is that information which regards his possible acceptable performance of the 
services for which he might be hired.”); see also Joseph R. Des Jardins & Ronald Duska, 
Drug Testing in Employment, in BUSINESS ETHICS:   READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE 
MORALITY 301, 302 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990) 
(explaining that “an employee’s right to privacy is violated whenever personal information 
is . . . collected, and/or used by an employer in a way or for any purpose that is irrelevant 
to . . . [their] contractual relationship.”). 
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Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which provide a three point 
reduction in an organization’s culpability score for maintaining an effective 
program designed to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its 
employees.230  But an organization can prevent its employees from 
violating the law only by gathering sufficient information about them to 
allow the organization to determine who is likely to violate the law, and by 
intensely monitoring the actions its employees take within the scope of 
their employment.  Indeed, this is precisely what the Guidelines require, 
because an effective compliance program requires organizations to “use 
reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial authority personnel 
of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, or should 
have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal 
activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and 
ethics program,”231 and “take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed, including 
monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct.”232  Therefore, the law 
creates incentives for organizations to violate their employees’ privacy in 
ways that conflict with the organizations’ ethical obligations not to do so. 
Once again, corporate managers are confronted with difficult ethical 
choices.  Do legal obligations to act as deputy law enforcement agents 
trump their ethical obligations to respect their employees’ dignity?  If not, 
how much risk of criminal liability or increased criminal penalties are 
managers required to run?  To what extent is it ethical to jeopardize the 
stockholders’ and other stakeholders’ material interests in order to preserve 
the intangible interests of the organization’s employees?  Putting yourself 
again in the place of the hypothetical CEO of MTS, recall that cooperation 
with the government requires the organization to review and turn over to 
the prosecution the records of all of Tudor’s appointments, phone calls, e-
mail correspondence, and personal revelations made in confidence to the 
organization’s corporate counsel.  How sure are you that this is the 
ethically correct thing to do? 
C. Confidentiality 
There is good reason to believe that organizations are ethically obligated 
to maintain the confidentiality of certain internal communications.  Like 
organizational justice and privacy, this obligation derives from both 
principled and practical considerations.  The principle involved is the basic 
ethical obligation to keep one’s word.  If one party reveals information to a 
                                                          
 230. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1(b). 
 231. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). 
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second only because the latter promises to keep the information 
confidential, the promise ethically binds the second party to do so.  This is 
equally true when the second party is an organization that is promising 
confidentiality to an employee or other stakeholder.  To obtain information 
under a promise of confidentiality and then disclose it under circumstances 
not agreed to by the confiding party is essentially to obtain the information 
by means of a false promise on which the confiding party relied in 
revealing the information.  Such action is ethically indistinguishable from 
fraud. 
On the practical level, confidentiality is necessary to facilitate the flow 
of information through the organization.  Employees (and outsiders) will 
often be unwilling to reveal information when they believe they will suffer 
adverse consequences if it becomes known they have done so.  This is 
especially true with regard to information indicating that they, their 
colleagues, or their superiors are involved in unethical or illegal behavior.  
Thus, only by promising confidentiality can organizations guarantee that 
their management will receive the information necessary for them to run 
not only efficiently, but ethically and legally as well. 
Like the obligations to maintain organizational justice and respect 
employee privacy, the obligation to preserve promised confidentiality is 
recognized by all normative approaches to business ethics.  From the 
stakeholder perspective, the obligation to preserve confidentiality is an 
aspect of the duty to avoid deceptive and fraudulent dealing that is implicit 
in the requirement to treat all stakeholders in accordance with the Kantian 
principle of respect for persons.233  From the social contract perspective, the 
obligation is an explicit requirement of the justice term of the contract, or 
in more contemporary terminology, a hypernorm, that is binding on all 
business organizations.234  Finally, from the stockholder perspective, the 
obligation is both explicitly recognized by the theory’s fundamental 
directive to maximize profits, or otherwise carry out the stockholder’s 
instructions without engaging in fraud or deception,235 and implicit in the 
fact that preserving confidentiality increases business organizations’ 
efficiency. 
Organizations usually promise confidentiality in two ways.  First, as a 
means of gathering sensitive information that otherwise would not be 
forthcoming, organizations often create lines of communication that 
circumvent the ordinary corporate chain of command, such as employee 
                                                          
 233. See Evan & Freeman, supra note 206, at 97; see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 27. 
 234. See DONALDSON, supra note 219, at 53; see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 30-31. 
 235. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 205, at 133 (stating that “there is one and only one social 
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition without deception or fraud.”). 
HASNAS 10/3/2005  1:33 PM 
2005] ETHICS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 637 
hotlines or organizational ombudsmen.236  To encourage employees to 
utilize such alternative lines of communication, organizations typically 
promise to keep any information transmitted through them confidential.  In 
this way, upper management hopes to receive information from lower level 
employees concerning the job performance and ethical behavior of the 
employees’ colleagues and superiors that could not be otherwise obtained.  
Second, in order to accumulate the information necessary both to defend 
the organization against civil lawsuits and criminal charges, and to ensure 
that the organization is complying with the law, organizations encourage 
their employees to provide information to corporate counsel under the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege.  That is, organizations promise 
their employees that if they talk to the organizations’ attorneys, what they 
say will not be revealed to outsiders unless it meets one of the recognized 
exceptions to the privilege. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the importance of 
an organization’s ability to promise the second type of confidentiality.237  
Noting that, given the legal standard for corporate criminal responsibility, 
[m]iddle-level—and indeed lower-level—employees can, by actions 
within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious 
legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have 
the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately 
to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties,238 
the Court recognized that the attorney-client privilege is necessary to 
encourage “the communication of relevant information by employees of the 
client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client 
corporation.”239  The Court further recognized that, given the advent of the 
myriad new substantive, regulatory, and secondary criminal offenses, the 
privilege was necessary to promote 
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s 
compliance with the law. In light of the vast and complicated array of 
regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, 
unlike most individuals, “constantly go to lawyers to find out how to 
obey the law,” particularly since compliance with the law in this area is 
hardly an instinctive matter.240 
Business organizations’ obligation to maintain promised confidentiality 
                                                          
 236. See James A. Waters, Catch 20.5: Corporate Morality as an Organizational 
Phenomenon, in CONTEMPORARY MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN BUSINESS 160 (A. Pablo 
Iannone ed., 1989); see also DONALDSON, supra note 219, at 154-55 (describing how many 
U.S. companies utilize “hot-lines” and “operator” policies to encourage employees to speak 
truthfully). 
 237. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 383 (1981). 
 238. Id. at 391. 
 239. Id. at 392. 
 240. Id. (citation omitted). 
HASNAS 10/3/2005  1:33 PM 
638 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:579 
is not absolute, of course, but is limited to the amount of confidentiality 
organizations have it within their power to grant.  Employers have never 
been able to promise employees (or others) complete confidentiality, 
merely the degree of confidentiality the law allows.  Thus, organizations 
cannot promise to keep revelations confidential in the face of a valid 
subpoena that does not improperly invade the attorney-client privilege.  
The most that organizations can, and hence do, promise their employees is 
that they will act in good faith to maintain confidentiality to the extent that 
they are legally permitted to do so. 
The incentives created by the law of white collar crime, however, are at 
odds with honoring even this limited obligation.  As previously noted, 
organizations’ strict liability for the offenses of their employees and the 
requirements of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines imply that 
organizations can avoid indictment or reduce their exposure to financial 
penalties only by cooperating with government investigations of their 
employees.241  But under the Guidelines, cooperation requires “the 
disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization,”242 
which in turn, may require the waiver of the attorney-client privilege.243  
Thus, to gain the benefits of cooperation, organizations must disclose to the 
government not merely all of the information they are legally required to 
disclose, but all relevant information in their possession.  Refusing to do so 
on the ground that such disclosure would violate a promise of 
confidentiality could subject an organization to a potentially massive 
increase in liability. 
This places corporate managers in an extremely difficult ethical 
situation.  To generate the information necessary to maintain an ethical 
workplace and ensure that the organization’s employees are complying 
with the law, management must promise its employees confidentiality.  But 
to avoid subjecting the organization to indictment and large monetary fines, 
management must not only breach that promise, but must do so before a 
government investigation has even begun—according to the Guidelines, 
“prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation.”244 
Furthermore, management cannot avoid the dilemma by making only a 
conditional promise to keep information confidential unless disclosure is 
necessary for the organization to cooperate with the government.  Such a 
promise would be patently self-defeating since it is tantamount to saying 
that the organization will keep the information confidential unless it is in 
the organization’s interest to disclose it, which is the same as saying it will 
                                                          
 241. See supra notes 171-194, 212 and accompanying text. 
 242. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12. 
 243. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text. 
 244. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(g)(1). 
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not keep the information confidential at all.  This type of promise is 
obviously valueless—something the Supreme Court recognized in the 
context of the attorney-client privilege, stating “if the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able 
to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will 
be protected.  An uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at 
all.”245  Hence, such a conditional promise will elicit no useful information 
from the organization’s employees and is equivalent to making no promise 
of confidentiality at all. 
But even an organization that decided not to promise any confidentiality 
for employees’ (or others’) communications could not escape the dilemma.  
By refusing on ethical grounds to make a promise that it knows it will have 
to break, such an organization could decide to conduct its business without 
the information that such a promise would generate.  But in doing so, it 
would be willingly foregoing one of the most effective means of detecting 
violations of law by its employees—a decision which would, under the 
Guidelines, cost the organization the three point reduction in culpability 
score for failing to have an effective compliance program.  As previously 
noted, one of the requirements for such a program is that the organization 
“have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow 
for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees 
and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual 
criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.”246  But since whistleblowers 
are usually subject to retaliation if their identity is known, such a reporting 
system not merely “may,” but virtually must be one that promises 
confidentiality.247  Indeed, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress 
required publicly traded companies to establish procedures for “the 
confidential, anonymous submission by employees of issues or concerns 
regarding questionable accounting or auditing practices.”248  Thus, even the 
                                                          
 245. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 393. 
 246. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C). 
 247. See Practising Law Institute, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the 
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249 (emphasis added).  The Sentencing Commissions proposed that the amendments to the 
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publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or 
confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and agents may report or seek 
guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.”  Notice 
of Submission to Congress of Amendments to The Sentencing Guidelines Effective 
November 1, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 28994, 29019 (proposed May 19, 2004). 
 248. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776 
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decision not to make a promise of confidentiality would significantly 
increase an organization’s potential liability.  In sum, the law of white 
collar crime brings intense pressure to bear on organizations to both make 
and breach promises of confidentiality. 
The conflict thus created presents corporate managers with several 
difficult ethical decisions.  What should they tell employees about the 
organization’s commitment to preserve the confidentiality of 
communications made through the employee hotline or under the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege?  If the organization promises to 
keep such communications confidential, is it ethical to breach that promise 
to protect the organization as a collective entity?  On the other hand, to 
what extent is it ethical to expose the stockholders and other stakeholders 
to the risk of loss associated with corporate indictment and increased 
criminal penalties in order to honor the organization’s commitment to 
individual employees, many of whom may have engaged in criminal 
wrongdoing?  Can corporate managers afford to honestly tell employees  
that the organization will disclose any incriminating communications made 
to the “confidential” employee hotline or to corporate counsel under the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege whenever doing so is necessary 
to gain the benefits of cooperation under the Guidelines?  If they do, will 
the organization be able to gather the information necessary to ensure that 
it is functioning ethically and in compliance with the law?  Would any 
employee involved in an offense be willing to come forward?  If not, how 
deceptive may the managers ethically be on this point? 
Recall the second vignette from the beginning of this article.  Stone Fund 
became aware of Gordon Gekko’s illegal behavior when Budd Fox 
approached the organization’s attorney for assurance that what he was 
doing for Gekko was legal.  Further, Fox spoke after being assured that his 
communications were protected by attorney-client privilege.  Upon 
learning that Gekko and Fox were engaged in criminal activity, what 
should Stone Fund’s management do?  If it decides to fire Gekko but not 
report his and Fox’s activities to the government, it exposes the 
organization to the risk of greatly enhanced penalties should the matter 
subsequently come to light.  Not only would Stone Fund lose the potential 
reductions to its culpability score for failing to have an effective 
compliance program and for failing to cooperate with the government, its 
score would be increased three points for its obstruction of justice.  On the 
other hand, the organization’s managers cannot report Gekko’s and Fox’s 
activities to the government and disclose “all pertinent information known 
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by the organization”249 without waiving its attorney-client privilege and 
violating its promise of confidentiality to Fox.  Assume again that you are 
one of the senior executives at Stone Fund.  How sure are you that you 
know what constitutes ethical behavior under these circumstances? 
D. Trust 
Unlike organizational justice, privacy, and confidentiality, trust does not 
embody an ethical principle.  Although ethicists have argued that corporate 
managers who actively encourage their subordinates to trust them are 
thereby invested with positive moral obligations for the subordinates’ well-
being,250 there is no independent moral obligation to trust others.  Trust is 
nevertheless inextricably linked to ethical concerns because its existence in 
the workplace is dependent on the ethical behavior of corporate 
management.  That is, unless corporate management meets its ethical 
obligations to its stakeholders and is perceived by them as doing so, no 
relationship of trust will develop or be maintained between the organization 
and its stakeholders.251  And because the maintenance of such a relationship 
of trust is essential to the success of the organization,252 trust serves as a 
necessary link between corporate performance and ethical behavior. 
Trust among stakeholders has become basic to the management of 
business firms in a competitive global economy.  Trust leads to 
commitment, which results in effort, which is essential for success. But, 
trust can be generated only by treating members of the stakeholder 
groups in ways that they consider to be “right” and “just” and “fair.”  
Treating groups in ways that can be considered to be “right” and “just” 
and “fair” is, of course, the domain of managerial ethics . . . .253 
An organization’s employees are one of its most important stakeholder 
groups.  However, the personal interests of individual employees often 
diverge from the corporate interest of the organization.  Consequently, 
businesses must expend resources to overcome the resulting commitment 
                                                          
 249. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 12. 
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problems, that is, to align the incentives of its individual employees with 
the achievement of the organization’s goals.  But, 
[b]ecause these commitment problems (opportunism) abound, firms that 
solve commitment problems efficiently will have a competitive 
advantage over those that do not.  Further, because ethical solutions to 
commitment problems are more efficient than mechanisms designed to 
curb opportunism, it follows that firms that contract (through their 
managers) with their [employees] on the basis of mutual trust and 
cooperation will have a competitive advantage over firms that do not.254 
An organization that maintains a relationship of trust with its employees 
“will experience reduced agency costs, transaction costs, and costs 
associated with team production.  More specifically, monitoring costs, 
bonding costs, search costs, warranty costs, and residual losses will be 
reduced. . . .  In such cases, overall contracting costs are reduced, and the 
benefits are shared among the firm and its stakeholders.”255  Hence, 
maintaining the trust of its employees can be crucial to an organization’s 
competitive success. 
Trust of the sort that can confer these advantages on organizations can 
develop only when three conditions are met:  vulnerability, assumption of 
duty, and openness.  First, trust requires vulnerability on the part of the 
trusting party.  That is, “trust requires that firms and individuals expose 
their vulnerabilities to one another when there is clear uncertainty and risk 
that harm could come to the firm, or individuals in the firm, from those 
who are trusted.”256  Second, trust requires the trusted party to voluntarily 
and openly assume an obligation to protect the interests of the vulnerable 
party.  That is, “[t]rust is generally accompanied by an assumption of an 
acknowledged or accepted duty to protect the rights and interests of others 
[that gives rise to a]n expectation of generous or helpful or, at the very 
least, nonharmful behavior on the part of the trusted person, group, or firm . 
. .”257  Finally, trust requires openness.  Trust depends “upon whether each 
[individual or firm] is prepared to open up to the other so as to reveal 
                                                          
 254. Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory:   A Synthesis of Ethics and 
Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 422 (1995). 
 255. Id.; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 60-72 (1992) (asserting 
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organization can reduce costs associated with resolving internal conflicts and dissatisfaction 
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 256. George G. Brenkert, Trust, Morality and International Business, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
293, 305 (1998); see LaRue Tone Hosmer, Trust:   The Connecting Link Between 
Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 379, 390 (1995)  
Trust generally occurs under conditions of vulnerability to the interests of the 
individual and dependence upon the behavior of other people. An essential part of 
the definition of trust is the expectation that the loss if trust is broken will be much 
greater than the gain when trust is maintained; otherwise, the decision to trust 
would be simple economic rationality. 
 257. Hosmer, supra note 256, at 392. 
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private or confidential information.”258  Such openness consists in “leveling 
with another, as well as not creating or permitting misleading expectations 
to be generated in the other.”259  Consequently, trust in the business 
environment has been defined as “the reliance by one person, group, or 
firm upon a voluntarily accepted duty on the part of another person, group, 
or firm to recognize and protect the rights and interests of all others 
engaged in a joint endeavor or economic exchange.”260 
The problem is that the incentives created by the law of white collar 
crime are antithetical to the development of this form of trust.  The 
standard for corporate criminal responsibility makes the organization 
strictly liable for the criminal offenses of its employees.  The advent of 
broad new substantive, regulatory, and secondary offenses exponentially 
increases the chances that employees will either intentionally, negligently, 
or in the case of public welfare offenses, innocently violate the law.  The 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines punish organizations that fail to aid 
in the prosecution of any of its employees who the government suspects of 
committing an offense.  These are hardly conditions that make it 
comfortable for organizations to repose significant amounts of trust in their 
employees, or for the employees to feel secure in relying on the 
organization’s commitment to protect their rights or interests.  More 
specifically, these are conditions that undermine the second and third 
requirements for the development of trust. 
The second requirement for trust is that organizations voluntarily and 
openly assume an obligation to protect the interests of their employees.  By 
punishing organizations that honor this obligation in the context of a 
criminal investigation, the law of white collar crime makes it extremely 
expensive for organizations to assume the necessary obligation.  
Employees obviously have  interests in being accorded procedural justice 
and having their privacy respected and confidences maintained.  But if an 
organization wants to avoid indictment and the prospect of greatly 
enhanced criminal punishment, it must sacrifice these interests to the 
government’s interest in the efficient investigation and punishment of 
crime.  Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, assuming an 
obligation to protect employees’ interests commits organizations to 
forgoing the culpability score reductions for effective compliance programs 
and cooperation and risking the potential increase for obstruction of justice.  
Hence, in the current legal environment, trust comes at a very high price.  
On the other hand, should an organization elect not to assume the 
obligation to protect its employees’ interests in the context of a criminal 
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investigation, trust will be considerably less likely to develop.  It is very 
difficult for an organization to generate “an expectation of generous or 
helpful or, at the very least, nonharmful behavior”261 toward its employees 
while it is aiding in their prosecution.262 
The third requirement for trust is openness.  It requires that an 
organization “level” with its employees and refrain from “creating or 
permitting misleading expectations to be generated”263 about how the 
organization will behave with regard to its employees.  If an organization 
leads or allows its employees to believe that it will afford them due 
process, respect their privacy, and maintain promised confidentiality and 
then fails to do so at the first hint of a criminal investigation, trust will be 
destroyed.  For an organization to deal openly with its employees, it must 
either frankly inform them that it will fully cooperate with governmental 
efforts to prosecute them or, if it claims it will not, make good on this claim 
and suffer the consequences of potential indictment and greatly enhanced 
penalties.  Since the first of these alternatives amounts to a declaration that 
the organization will not protect its employees’ interests, it is essentially 
equivalent to telling the employees not to trust the organization.  Openly 
refusing to assume the obligation necessary to generate trust obviously will 
not generate trust.  But the second alternative, which can generate trust, 
highlights how expensive trust becomes in the context of the federal 
government’s campaign against white collar crime. 
Thus, the law of white collar crime again places conscientious business 
managers in a difficult position.  Because the trust of their organizations’ 
employees is an important business asset, the manager’s obligation to the 
organizations’ stockholders and/or stakeholders requires them to try to 
maintain it.  But the maintenance of employees’ trust requires a 
commitment to precisely those forms of ethical organizational conduct 
(e.g., adhering to the standards of organizational justice, respecting 
employee privacy, and maintaining promised confidentiality) that the law 
of white collar crime discourages.  As a result, managers again find 
themselves forced to balance their ethical obligations against their 
obligation to fully comply with the law. 
Because organizations are strictly liable for the offenses of their 
employees, the more trust managers invest in their employees, the more 
vulnerable they render their organizations to criminal sanction.  In the first 
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place, the more managers trust their employees and refrain from directly 
monitoring their conduct, the easier it becomes for unscrupulous employees 
to commit criminal offenses for which the organization is liable.  
Additionally, this very trust will result in increased penalties for such 
offenses by preventing the organizations from receiving the culpability 
score reduction for effective compliance programs.  On the other hand, the 
more managers take actions designed to guard against criminal liability and 
reduce potential penalties, the more they erode the culture of trust within 
their organizations.  The very act of monitoring their employees’ conduct 
in order to detect and prevent the violations of law for which the 
organization will be held liable can generate a level of suspicion and 
invasion of privacy sufficient to undermine trust.264  And to the extent that 
managers comply with the Guidelines’ incentives by sacrificing their 
employees’ interests to the government’s, they make it increasingly 
unlikely that employees will trust their motives in future dealings. 
Thus, managers are once again called upon to confront an array of 
difficult ethical choices.  How much of their employees’ trust should they 
be willing to sacrifice to protect the organization from potential legal 
liability?  Is it ethical to expose the organization to the risk of indictment 
and enhanced criminal penalties in order to protect the interests of their 
individual employees sufficiently to generate trust?  To the extent that an 
organization’s management elects to ignore the Guidelines’ incentives in 
order to honor its ethical obligations to its employees, it becomes 
imperative for it to prevent its least scrupulous employees from violating 
the law.  But since ferreting out potential criminals requires secret and 
potentially deceptive monitoring practices, how can management do this 
without thereby destroying the very trust that it is seeking to maintain?265  
And is it ethical to subject the majority of honest employees to this level of 
monitoring to protect the organization from the small minority of potential 
criminals? 
Imagine again that you are a senior executive at Stone Fund when Budd 
Fox informs corporate counsel about Gordon Gekko’s and his activities.  
Should you fire Fox and report him to the SEC and DOJ as the Guidelines’ 
standards for cooperation require?  If you do, what will be the effect on 
your organization when word gets out that this was done after Fox 
voluntarily came forward under a promise of confidentiality?  To what 
extent will the organization’s employees trust management’s 
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representations to them in the future?  But, as the cases of Drexel Burnham 
Lambert and Arthur Andersen make clear, mere indictment could destroy a 
financial services company like Stone Fund.266  Under such circumstances, 
is it ethical not to take every step prescribed by the Thompson Memo to 
avoid indictment?  What precisely can you do to maintain a climate of trust 
within the organization without putting the very existence of the 
organization at risk? 
E. Ethical Self-Assessment 
It is possible that the different normative approaches to business ethics 
yield distinct sets of ethical obligations for managers.  Although the 
stockholder, stakeholder, and social contract approaches coincide in 
prescribing the obligations to provide organizational justice, respect 
privacy, and maintain promised confidentiality, they may prescribe widely 
differing obligations in other respects.  But whatever the precise 
configuration of managers’ ethical obligations, managers are obviously 
required to make good faith efforts to honor them.  This requires, at a 
minimum, that managers know what is going on within their organization. 
Although this may sound simple, in an organization of any considerable 
size, it is not.  Many features of an organization’s structure can impede the 
flow of information within the organization.  Most large organizations are 
beset with what have been called “organizational blocks”—obstructions to 
information that result from “practices that are quite legitimate and 
inevitable in any complex organization,”267 and constitute the “unintended 
consequence[s] of organizational operating and control systems.”268  Thus, 
features such as the effect of strong role models in the organization, the 
strict line of command, the development of task group cohesiveness, the 
separation of decision-making authority, and the division of work between 
different units of the organization have all been identified as organizational 
blocks.269  Further, the internal dynamics of individual advancement within 
organizations can also greatly hamper the flow of information.  As 
individuals with differential bits of knowledge seek to avoid blame for 
negative outcomes and claim credit for positive ones, information becomes 
increasingly distorted and non-specific.270  Indeed, the barriers to the free 
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flow of information within organizations that arise because “[c]orporations 
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties 
and operations into smaller components”271 were the basis for the 
development of the collective knowledge standard for corporate criminal 
responsibility.272 
This means that corporate managers cannot meet their obligation to 
ensure that their organization is functioning both ethically and legally 
merely by reviewing the information that reaches their desks.   They must 
actively seek out the information necessary to form an accurate picture of 
what is taking place within their organization.  Thus, organizations have a 
positive duty to engage in ethical and legal self-assessment. 
Organizations usually go about fulfilling this duty in the ways touched 
upon in connection with the discussion of confidentiality.273  To learn of 
potential ethical problems, organizations set up alternative, usually 
confidential, channels of communication that allow employees to voice 
ethical concerns without fear of damaging their careers.  By utilizing 
employee hotlines, ombudsmen, or ethics officers, organizations seek to 
circumvent both organizational blocks and the information-distorting 
effects of bureaucracy and personal interest.  To learn of potential legal 
problems, organizations authorize their corporate counsel to gather 
information and conduct internal investigations under the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege.  This allows organizations to avoid organizational 
blocks by going directly to the source of the information and to overcome 
the obscuring effects of self-interest by assuring employees that their 
statements to counsel will not be used against them at a later time.  These 
mechanisms allow corporate managers to gather the information necessary 
to prevent or correct ethical lapses or legal violations. 
The problem with this is that the law of white collar crime makes 
engaging in such self-assessment a dangerous and potentially costly 
activity.  This is because, under the Guidelines, any self-assessment that 
produces evidence suggestive of criminal activity would trigger a duty to 
immediately report the potential violation  to the government and to fully 
cooperate in any resulting investigation, if the organization wishes to 
receive the culpability score reduction for cooperation.  But because 
organizations are strictly liable for the offenses of their employees and 
because the reward for cooperation under the Guidelines is not immunity 
from prosecution, but reduced penalties upon conviction,274 organizations 
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are placed in the position of having to aid in their own prosecution.  There 
is considerably less incentive to undertake voluntary self-assessment when, 
by doing so, an organization may be developing the evidence that will lead 
to its conviction of a criminal offense.  Furthermore, to receive the 
culpability score reduction for cooperation, organizations must disclose “all 
pertinent information known by the organization.”275  If this information 
was elicited by corporate counsel pursuant to the attorney-client privilege, 
doing so will require waiver of the privilege.  But because waiving the 
privilege with regard to any outside party waives it with regard to all 
outside parties—because the courts do not recognize the doctrine of 
selective waiver276—any information the organization discloses to the 
government will also be discoverable by private parties.  As a result, an 
organization that undertakes a self-assessment is practically inviting civil 
litigation since any evidence of wrongdoing will be made public. 
Once again, the law of white collar crime creates a conflict for corporate 
managers.  Ethically, they have a duty to undertake the type of self-
assessment necessary to ensure that their organization is meeting its ethical 
and legal obligations.  If they elect to undertake such an assessment, 
however, and then discover potential criminal activity, they must either 
reveal this information to the government, rendering the organization liable 
to both criminal penalties and civil damages awards, or conceal the 
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information, rendering the organization liable to severely enhanced 
criminal penalties if the information subsequently comes to light.  On the 
other hand, if they do not undertake a self-assessment, there is a chance that 
any wrongdoing that may be occurring will never be discovered, and 
further, that if it later comes to light through the ordinary corporate 
reporting channels, the organization can cooperate with the government at 
that time.  Under these circumstances, the least damaging course of action 
can appear to be to refrain from undertaking efforts at self-assessment at 
all.  Indeed, there is evidence that many organizations avoid formal self-
assessment because they are aware that an organization that undertakes one 
“can inadvertently land itself in serious legal trouble.”277  For example, a 
survey of major U.S. corporations undertaken by the Center for Effective 
Organizations at the University of Southern California suggested that 
organizational self-assessments are underutilized because corporate 
directors “are worried that any record of self-criticism might come back to 
haunt them in a shareholder suit or a government investigation” and “are 
fearful that [damaging] statements will show up in court proceedings (or be 
leaked to the press by plaintiffs’ attorneys).”278 
Think back to the third vignette with which I began this article.  Imagine 
you are the new CEO of Endrun, trying to bring the company back from the 
brink of insolvency.  Imagine further that the financial condition of the 
company has recently begun to improve and that you believe that if Endrun 
can weather the next six months, you may be able to return it to 
profitability.  Although you have no reason to believe that any of Endrun’s 
current employees are engaged in illegal activities, you are conscious of the 
fact that as a newcomer to the company, there may be things you are 
unaware of.  Should you authorize an ethical/legal self-assessment?  Is it 
even ethical to do so if you know that one more public scandal would 
destroy the company?  Precisely what obligation do you have to undertake 
an ethical self-assessment when the discovery of any wrongdoing must be 
made public and can subject the corporation to criminal penalties and civil 
liability? 
CONCLUSION 
Let us conclude by returning to the quiz with which this article began.  
Viewed from a strictly legal perspective, it is now clear that the correct 
answer to all three questions is ‘e.’  Yet, it is doubtful whether many people 
would chose ‘e’ as representing the ethically correct course of action. 
Consider the first question on the quiz.  Legally speaking, ‘a’ and ‘c’ 
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represent the most dangerous courses of action.  In both cases, the CEO is 
electing not to meet the Thompson Memorandum’s and Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of cooperation, thereby subjecting the 
corporation to increased risk of indictment and significantly enhanced 
penalties if convicted.  Further, if in aiding Marsha Tudor in her defense 
under ‘a’ or in preparing the corporation’s defense under ‘c,’ corporate 
counsel or anyone in corporate management suggests that any MTS 
employee assert his or her Fifth Amendment right or otherwise refrain from 
voluntarily cooperating with the government, the corporation risks the 
culpability score enhancement for obstruction of justice. 
Both ‘b’ and ‘d’ are marginally better, but still dangerous, choices.  With 
regard to ‘b,’ it is clearly false that the matter does not concern the 
corporation. Tudor is charged with securities fraud for attempting to prop 
up the value of MTS stock.  As the Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
MTS, this conduct is clearly within the scope of her employment.  Hence, 
MTS is strictly liable for her offense.  By instructing the corporation to take 
no action, the CEO is, in essence, instructing it to refuse to cooperate with 
the government and thereby sacrificing the opportunity to lower the 
corporation’s risk of being indicted and to reduce any potential penalties 
the corporation may incur.  On the other hand, he or she is also making it 
less likely that the corporation will receive the culpability score 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  With regard to ‘d,’ the CEO’s offer 
to cooperate with the government will be insufficient either to reduce the 
risk of indictment or to earn the culpability score reduction for cooperation.  
By acting to preserve the corporation’s defenses and promises of 
confidentiality, the CEO is refusing to disclose all pertinent information 
possessed by MTS, and hence failing to meet the Thompson 
Memorandum’s and Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of cooperation.  His 
or her offer to cooperate in other respects does, however, greatly reduce the 
chance that the corporation will receive the culpability score enhancement 
for obstruction of justice. 
In electing any of options ‘a’ through ‘d,’ the CEO is essentially betting 
the corporation’s interest on Tudor’s exoneration, even though he or she is 
not sure that Tudor is innocent.  Only ‘e’ allows the corporation to improve 
its legal position regardless of the outcome of Tudor’s case.  By authorizing 
the corporation to plead guilty, the CEO is meeting the requirement that the 
corporation “clearly demonstrate[ ] recognition and affirmative acceptance 
of responsibility for its criminal conduct.”279  By waiving attorney-client 
privilege and turning over Tudor’s records, he or she is meeting the 
requirement that the corporation disclose “all pertinent information known 
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by the organization.”280  And by turning over all relevant records in the 
corporation’s possession, the CEO is ensuring that there can be no effort at 
concealment or alteration that could constitute obstruction of justice.  These 
actions satisfy all the requirements for the five point culpability score 
reduction for self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility, 
and maximize the likelihood that the DOJ will decide not to indict the 
corporation.  From a purely legal perspective, ‘e’ is obviously the correct 
choice. 
‘E’ is not obviously the ethically correct choice, however. Tudor 
founded and built the company and her ongoing association with it has 
been a large factor in its continued success.  Her hard work over the years 
has provided all of MTS’ employees with the opportunity for successful 
and rewarding careers.  Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that MTS owes her a duty of loyalty.  There is certainly good 
reason to believe that it owes her at least the presumption of innocence and 
due process.  If this is the case, then from the ethical perspective, ‘a’ is not 
necessarily an outlandish choice.  But perhaps there is no duty of loyalty in 
a business setting or, if there is, a corporate officer’s duty to protect his or 
her company’s other stakeholders overrides it.  In that case, ‘b,’ and 
especially ‘c’ and ‘d,’ may appear to be appropriate ethical choices.  ‘E’ on 
the other hand, is problematic.  To the extent that Tudor communicated 
with corporate counsel under the promise of confidentiality inherent in the 
attorney-client privilege, the corporation’s gratuitous disclosure of those 
communications to the government would constitute the ethical equivalent 
of fraud.  Further, by turning over to the government all records of Tudor’s 
appointments, phone calls, and e-mails without regard to whether they 
contain job-related or purely personal information, the corporation may be 
violating Tudor’s right to privacy.  From an ethical perspective, ‘e’ is 
almost certainly the wrong choice. 
Now consider the second question on the quiz.  Legally speaking, ‘a’ 
again represents the most dangerous choice.  In the first place, the company 
is obviously sacrificing the five point culpability score reduction for 
cooperation by aiding Fox in putting on a defense.  It is also greatly 
increasing the likelihood that it will be indicted by ignoring the Thompson 
Memorandum’s warning that, in deciding whether to bring an indictment, 
the DOJ will consider whether “the corporation appears to be protecting its 
culpable employees . . . either through the advancing of attorneys fees, 
through retaining the employees without sanction for their misconduct, or 
through providing information to the employees about the government’s 
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investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement . . . .”281  In addition, by 
retaining Fox without punishment, the company is sacrificing the three 
point reduction for having an effective compliance program since, 
according to the Guidelines, “[a]dequate discipline of individuals 
responsible for an offense is a necessary component of [the] 
enforcement”282 required for a compliance program to be considered 
effective.  And, as in Tudor’s case, if the company advises any of its 
employees to refrain from voluntarily cooperating with the government, it 
risks the three point enhancement for obstruction of justice. 
‘B,’ ‘c,’ and ‘d’ represent slightly better, but still dangerous choices.  
Under ‘b,’ the company will still lose the reductions for having an effective 
compliance program by not disciplining or firing Fox and for cooperation 
by failing to satisfy the requirements of the Thompson Memorandum and 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, but it is unlikely to incur the 
enhancement for obstruction of justice.  Under ‘c’ and ‘d,’ the company 
may gain the three point reduction for its compliance program, but it is still 
sacrificing the opportunity to avoid indictment or receive the five point 
reduction for cooperation by failing to actively aid in Fox’s prosecution.  
Once again, ‘e,’ which offers the company an enhanced prospect of 
avoiding indictment altogether and of minimizing its fine if indicted and 
convicted, is the legally correct choice. 
But again, ‘e’ is not the ethically correct choice.  Stone Fund hired Fox 
straight out of business school and placed him under the direction of one of 
the company’s most powerful senior brokers, who was corrupt.  By doing 
so, the company bears at least some responsibility for Fox’s legal 
predicament.  If Fox truly did not realize that he was engaged in illegal 
activity, and especially if the company learned of Gekko’s activities 
through Fox’s queries to corporate counsel, Fox would have been acting as 
a loyal, if misguided, employee.  Under these circumstances, it is entirely 
reasonable to believe that the principle of reciprocity imposes an ethical 
obligation on the company to help Fox deal with both his legal troubles and 
damaged career prospects.  If so, then ‘a’ may represent the ethically 
correct course for the company to take.  But again, if one does not believe 
there is a duty of loyalty in business or believes that managers’ obligations 
to the firm’s stakeholders override any such duty, then ‘b,’ and perhaps ‘c’ 
and ‘d,’ can appear to be ethically acceptable choices.  ‘C’ and ‘d’ may 
raise questions, however, because firing Fox and, especially firing him and 
reporting his activities to the government, will almost certainly damage the 
level of trust within the company.  Once the employees see that the 
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company will sacrifice someone like Fox to protect its financial interests, 
they will be very unlikely to trust any future representation the company 
may make to protect their rights and interests.  ‘E’ presents even more 
problems.  By aiding in Fox’s prosecution, the company is acting 
punitively toward an employee who is in trouble, at least in part, for 
following the directives of its senior management.  It is also failing to 
honor the promise of confidentiality it extended with the attorney-client 
privilege.  Much more than either ‘c’ or ‘d,’ such conduct makes it clear 
that the company cannot be relied on to protect the interests of its 
employees, and will be destructive of the trust between employees and 
management that is so important to the successful functioning of a financial 
services company.  Again, if one disregards its legal advantages, ‘e’ is 
almost certainly the ethically wrong choice. 
Finally, consider the third question on the quiz.  From the legal 
perspective, there is little difference among choices ‘a,’ ‘b,’ ‘c,’ and ‘d.’  In 
none of these cases can Endrun expect to avoid indictment or receive a 
culpability score reduction on the basis of cooperation.  To begin with, by 
covering Kevin Lie’s legal expenses, the corporation is acting in a way 
which, under the Thompson Memorandum, indicates a lack of cooperation.  
Further, by preparing a defense or refusing to waive attorney-client 
privilege, the corporation is failing to disclose all pertinent information 
known to it, and thus, under the Guidelines’ definition, is failing to fully 
cooperate  with the government.  Finally, by putting on a defense, the 
corporation is failing to manifest the acceptance of responsibility necessary 
for a reduction in culpability score because the “adjustment is not intended 
to apply to an organization that puts the government to its burden of proof 
at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt.”283 
In contrast, ‘e’ meets all legal requirements for cooperation.  By 
indicating a willingness to plead guilty, Endrun is meeting the requirement 
for acceptance of responsibility.  And by refusing to pay Lie’s legal 
expenses, waiving attorney-client privilege, turning over all potentially 
relevant documents to the government, and otherwise aiding in Mr. Lie’s 
prosecution, the corporation is meeting all of the other requirements of the 
Thompson Memorandum and Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.  
These actions maximize Endrun’s chances of avoiding indictment and of 
receiving the smallest possible fine if indicted and convicted.  Thus, ‘e’ is 
again the legally superior choice. 
And once again, ‘e’ is ethically the most questionable choice.  In this 
case, it is not clear whether ‘a’ is the ethically appropriate response.  If the 
actions that Lie has been indicted for really represented his good faith 
                                                          
 283. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 13. 
HASNAS 10/3/2005  1:33 PM 
654 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:579 
efforts to bring Endrun through a crisis, the corporation may have a duty of 
loyalty to help him defend himself.  On the other hand, it may be argued 
that Lie brought his predicament upon himself by hiring and failing to 
adequately supervise corrupt subordinates.  If so, his negligence 
significantly damaged the company, and the company may owe him little 
loyalty and support.  In this case, the ethically appropriate course of action 
may be either ‘b,’ ‘c,’ or ‘d.’  Regardless of whether Endrun owes Lie any 
active support, it owes him at least the presumption of innocence, which 
requires that Endrun meet its obligations to him until it has adequate 
evidence that he has behaved improperly.  This means that it should honor 
both its promise to reimburse his legal expenses and its promise to keep his 
communications to corporate counsel confidential.  ‘B,’ ‘c,’ and ‘d’ are all 
consistent with these obligations.  ‘E’ is not.  Under ‘e,’ the corporation is 
denying Lie the presumption of innocence, abrogating its commitments to 
reimburse his legal expenses and maintain promised confidentiality, and 
helping the government circumvent Lie’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination by attempting to obtain and turn over to the government 
documents in his personal possession.284  Discounting its legal effect, ‘e’ is 
very unlikely to be the ethically proper course of conduct. 
These hypothetical cases show that in the realm of white collar crime, 
ethics and compliance are not coextensive.  One can be acting in 
compliance with all legal requirements and incentives and still be behaving 
unethically, and one can be behaving ethically while failing to comply with 
various aspects of the law of white collar crime.  Fortunately, in most 
cases, ethical conduct and legal compliance do in fact coincide.  But in an 
ever-increasing number of cases, the federal campaign against white collar 
crime is directly at odds with the efforts of business people to behave 
ethically.  Indeed, in business schools throughout the country, future 
MBA’s are currently being taught that they have ethical obligations to their 
firm’s employees and other stakeholders that can trump the firm’s financial 
interest, and that effective management requires adherence to the principles 
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of organizational justice and action that is productive of trust between a 
firm and its employees.  Although the first and third of my hypothetical 
cases are obviously based on the Martha Stewart case and the Enron 
scandal, the second could be drawn from almost any contemporary 
business ethics course.  In such a course, this case would be offered to 
show why ‘a’ is the ethically correct course of conduct.  Why this 
divergence between ethics and compliance? 
Ethics is concerned with moral desert.  Ethically speaking, only morally 
blameworthy action should be punished.  This is true of the traditional 
criminal law as well, which—with certain well-known 
exceptions285—is designed to punish only those who have acted in a 
morally culpable manner.  The inherent liberalism of  the traditional 
criminal law can be understood as the law’s internal morality, an embedded 
code designed to ensure that the law remains true to this purpose.  Viewed 
in this way, the ban on vicarious criminal liability and the requirement of a 
mens rea consisting of intentional or reckless conduct makes perfect sense.  
So does the principle of legality’s requirement of clearly defined criminal 
offenses, since for conduct that is not obviously malum in se, one acts 
culpably only if one knows that his or her conduct is legally prohibited.  
And so do the procedural safeguards, which are designed to make it 
difficult for those invested with the power to enforce the criminal law to 
use it for purposes other than the punishment of morally culpable conduct.  
Hence, there is little divergence between ethics and compliance in the 
traditional criminal law because the law’s inherent liberalism essentially 
writes ethics into the law. 
In the beginning of this article, I defined the law of white collar crime as 
the law designed to police the behavior of those involved in business for 
honest dealing and regulatory compliance.  I might just as well have 
defined it as the body of criminal law that cannot be effectively enforced 
consistent with the law’s internal morality.  Although the inherent 
liberalism of the traditional criminal law keeps the law true to its purpose 
of punishing only morally culpable conduct, it does so by reducing the 
efficiency of governmental law enforcement efforts.  In the context of an 
undertaking as monumentally difficult as policing the business 
environment of the entire United States for honest dealing and regulatory 
compliance, this reduction in efficiency is sufficient to render the law 
virtually unenforceable.  Given this, it should be completely unsurprising 
that the development of the law of white collar crime described in Part II of 
this article consisted of the evolution of various mechanisms for 
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circumventing the liberal characteristics of the traditional criminal law.  As 
both the courts and Congress have continually pointed out, doing so was 
the only way to prevent white collar criminal law from becoming a dead 
letter. 
The substantive protections provided by the ban on vicarious criminal 
liability, the mens rea requirement, and the principle of legality clearly had 
to be abandoned or relaxed if the statutes against white collar crime were to 
be enforced.  The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this in creating 
corporate criminal responsibility, abandoning the ban on vicarious criminal 
liability purely on enforcement grounds—that is, because if “corporations 
may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and 
purposes of their agents, . . . many offenses might go unpunished”286 and 
because preserving the ban “would virtually take away the only means of 
effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed 
at.”287  The Court similarly justified the relaxation of the mens rea 
requirement to permit conviction for merely negligent, and even entirely 
innocent actions on the basis that, due to the “increasingly numerous and 
detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of 
particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, 
safety or welfare, . . . [the preservation of the scienter requirement would] 
impair[ ] the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as 
presently constituted.”288  Finally, the attenuation of the principle of 
legality necessary to permit the creation of vaguely-defined, broad offenses 
such as mail fraud and RICO was justified on the grounds that such 
offenses were necessary to “cope with the new varieties of fraud that the 
ever-inventive American ‘con artist’ is sure to develop”289 and “to bring 
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities 
of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and 
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope 
and impact.”290 
Effective enforcement similarly required circumvention of the traditional 
law’s procedural safeguards.  Thus, the Court justified denying the Fifth 
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination not only to corporations, 
but also to individuals subpoenaed in their capacity as employees of 
corporations on the ground that not doing so “would have a detrimental 
impact on the Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar crime,’ one 
of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities.”291  
Secondary offenses such as money laundering, false statements, and 
obstruction of justice, which are designed solely to aid in law enforcement 
efforts, allow prosecutors to sidestep the requirement of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt by providing, in the words of two of them, “the ability to 
prosecute a wrongdoer when there is either insufficient evidence of the 
underlying criminal conduct or insufficient evidence connecting the 
wrongdoer to the underlying criminal conduct.”292  Similarly, the 
presumption of innocence and the attorney-client privilege are 
compromised by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines’ culpability 
score adjustments for obstruction of justice, compliance programs, and 
cooperation, which, being specifically designed to aid law enforcement, 
effectively punish organizations that maintain their innocence or assert the 
privilege. 
The law of white collar crime, then, is that portion of the criminal law 
that has been significantly divorced from the law’s internal morality.  The 
essential purpose of white collar criminal law is not the punishment of 
morally culpable conduct, but the effective enforcement of congressionally-
created rules of behavior and regulations.  To the extent that these rules and 
regulations prohibit conduct that is not clearly morally blameworthy, it is 
reasonable to expect the requirements of compliance with the law and the 
demands of ethics to diverge.  And this is precisely what has happened.   
As long as the imposition of criminal sanctions on organizations and 
individuals who commit white collar offenses remains a priority, there is no 
way out of the dilemma this situation creates.  Effective criminal 
enforcement requires the type of measures that create ethical dilemmas for 
conscientious business people.  Structuring the law to allow business 
people to honor their ethical obligations would be equivalent to restoring 
the liberal characteristics of the traditional criminal law that render the law 
of white collar crime unenforceable.  But before simply accepting this state 
of affairs, it is worth considering whether the criminal punishment of those 
who commit white collar offenses should remain a priority.  For it is not 
clear how much is gained by such punishment. 
White collar criminal offenses consist in regulatory violations and 
deceptive or dishonest business practices not already punishable under the 
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traditional criminal law.  If the defendant is an organization, it can only be 
punished financially.  If the organization’s offense consists of a breach of a 
regulation, it is already subject to a civil penalty for the violation.  In this 
case, a criminal conviction serves only to increase the amount of the money 
the organization must pay.  But if a greater financial penalty is appropriate, 
the obvious thing to do is to increase the size of the civil penalty, not create 
a duplicative criminal offense.  If the offense consists in deceptive or 
dishonest behavior by one of the organization’s employees that results in a 
loss to the organization’s stockholders or any other party, the organization 
is subject to civil lawsuit and the payment of compensatory and, if the 
conduct is intentional or reckless, punitive damages.  Once again, criminal 
punishment can only increase the amount of money the organization must 
pay.  And because this additional purely punitive amount is paid by the 
organization’s shareholders who are innocent of wrongdoing rather than by 
the actual guilty parties, it cannot be justified on retributive grounds. 
It can be argued that forcing organizations to pay an additional amount 
beyond the compensatory and punitive damages resulting from civil 
lawsuits is justified by its deterrent effect.  The claim is that threatening the 
organization with additional monetary losses will make it more vigilant in 
supervising its employees to ensure that they do not engage in dishonest or 
deceptive behavior.  There is reason to doubt this claim, however.  Because 
the threat of civil liability already provides organizations with adequate 
incentives to properly supervise their employees, additional criminal 
liability can only be over-deterrence.  Organizations are already strictly 
liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of their 
employment.  Should an organization fail to exercise proper oversight to 
prevent deceptive or fraudulent practices by its employees, it can be made 
to pay not only compensatory damages, but also potentially massive 
punitive damages.  Further, because civil plaintiffs are not subject to the 
restrictions that the criminal law imposes upon prosecutors, it is easier for 
them to establish liability.  The type of complaints civil plaintiffs may bring 
are not limited by the principle of legality; plaintiffs’ efforts at discovery 
cannot be thwarted by a Fifth Amendment privilege; the defendant is not 
vested with a presumption of innocence that the plaintiff must overcome; 
and the plaintiff is not required to prove the elements of his or her case 
beyond reasonable doubt.  It is difficult to see how the threat of additional 
criminal liability, which is more difficult to establish and, hence, less likely 
to be imposed, can increase the organization’s vigilance.  On the other 
hand, as the Arthur Andersen case demonstrates, because a criminal 
conviction can deplete the resources an organization has available to pay 
civil judgments, it can have the untoward effect of making it impossible for 
victims to recover their losses.  Andersen had actually negotiated a $750 
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million settlement with Enron’s shareholders which fell through when the 
firm was indicted.293  Given the disparity between a $750 million 
settlement and the relatively small fine that can be levied for obstruction of 
justice, it is difficult to see what end is served by a criminal conviction that 
not only wipes out the firm’s ability to compensate victims, but also 
destroys the careers of thousands of Andersen employees who had nothing 
to do with the Enron case or the destruction of documents. 
The situation may be different, however, when the defendant is an 
individual.  Unlike organizations, individuals can be incarcerated.  Perhaps 
the imprisonment of individuals who commit white collar offenses serves 
important retributivist or deterrent ends.  But then again, perhaps not.  
When the offense is a public welfare offense that requires no mens rea, 
or an offense that requires only ordinary negligence, it is unclear how 
incarceration, or punishment of any kind, advances either end.  Because the 
defendant has not acted in a morally blameworthy manner in committing 
such offenses, punishment cannot be justified on retributivist grounds. 
Further, because it was not the defendant’s conscious plan to violate the 
regulation, the threat of punishment can have no deterrent effect.  In cases 
such as these, the defendant may owe others or society compensation or the 
disgorgement of wrongfully acquired gains, but no legitimate end is served 
by his or her criminal punishment.  And if a monetary payment is 
appropriate, this can be attained through the imposition of a civil penalty 
for the violation. 
But what about individuals who intentionally violate regulations or 
engage in deceptive or dishonest business practices?  In such cases, the 
defendants have both acted culpably, meriting punishment, and can be 
deterred by the threat of incarceration.  But here is where the perfect 
becomes the enemy of the good.  Keep in mind that white collar offenses 
consist of regulatory violations and deceptive or dishonest behavior that is 
not punishable under the traditional criminal law.  The campaign against 
white collar crime is not a campaign against actual fraud, which is already 
subject to punishment, but against the type of behavior that does not 
amount to actual fraud but is nevertheless unfair, deceptive, or dishonest.  
In essence, then, the purpose of the campaign against white collar crime is 
to raise the ethical level of business behavior above the baseline supplied 
by the traditional criminal law. 
Individuals who unfairly violate regulations or engage in deceptive or 
dishonest business practices do so for financial gain.  If they are 
discovered, they will probably be discharged from their jobs and have their 
careers destroyed.  If their conduct amounts to actual fraud, they will be 
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subject to prosecution under the rules of the traditional criminal law.  If it 
does not, they will be subject to civil lawsuits that will cause them to at 
least give up all ill-gotten gains and probably will impoverish them.  
Hence, the market and civil liability sanctions against such individuals are 
considerable. 
Because the imposition of additional financial penalties on such 
individuals would be pointless, the effort to subject them to the criminal 
sanction can only be for purposes of incarceration.  Such punishment can 
be justified on retributive grounds if the market and civil liability sanctions 
are truly insufficient relative to the defendants’ culpability.  It can also be 
justified on deterrent grounds if the threat of imprisonment would deter at 
least some individuals who would not be deterred by the prospect of the 
loss of their careers and wealth.  It must be conceded, however, that the 
gain in either retributive or deterrent value, although real, is relatively 
small. 
But at what cost are these gains purchased?  The answer to this question 
has been the subject of this article.  The cost of this crusade to achieve 
perfect justice is the abandonment of the internal morality of the criminal 
law and the ethical dilemmas it imposes on the business community.  It 
appears that in order to utilize the criminal law to raise the ethical level of 
business behavior among those given to unscrupulous action, we must 
incentivize unethical behavior on the part of those who are conscientious.  
This is a textbook example of a Pyrrhic victory.  Here truly is a game that is 
not worth the candle. 
Given this situation, let me conclude this article with the thought that the 
solution to the problem of white collar crime might not consist in more 
vigorous federal enforcement efforts, but in no such enforcement efforts at 
all. 
 
